

**What kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era?  
National agency, transnational coalitions  
and the challenges of sustainable peace.**

Stephen Baranyi, Principal Researcher  
The North-South Institute, Canada

**Working paper  
October 2005**

**“What Kind of Peace is Possible?” (WKOP) project**

Final version to be published in a book  
with other WKOP papers in mid-2006

**Co-funded by the**

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)

International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Ford Foundation

Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD)

**For more information on the WKOP project,  
including all core partners and outputs,  
see [www.nsi-ins.ca](http://www.nsi-ins.ca)**

## **Executive summary**

The projects of postwar peacebuilding, conflict prevention and responding to fragile states are at a crossroads. The international community has accumulated much knowledge about good practices in these domains. It has undertaken impressive policy commitments through the UN and the OECD Development Assistance Committee. Yet analyses of practice on the ground, across the varied landscape of the South, suggest that policy-practice gaps are persisting and even growing in the post-9/11 era.

This paper looks at the evolution of policy commitments and thinking on peacebuilding, against the backdrop of other agendas such as the responsibility to protect (R2P). It analyzes disjunctions between policy and practice overall, and focuses on gaps in the areas of democratic governance and economic development. It looks at tensions between short-term measures and the longer-term structural changes necessary to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict. Going beyond the common focus of peacebuilding debates on international agencies, the paper examines less visible contributions by national actors such as municipal governments and women's organizations. Yet it does not romanticize those actors. Indeed, it poses the stark question of what type of peace is really possible – sustainable peace, war termination or much less – in the post-9/11 era, given the alignments of forces that are gelling from the local to the global level across the world.

This question is the core problem that a network of researchers and practitioners is grappling with in Afghanistan, Guatemala, Haiti, Mozambique, the Palestinian Territories and Sri Lanka, through the “What Kind of Peace is Possible” project (WKOP). This introductory paper sets out ten propositions that we are examining through research and policy dialogue in each country. It suggests that the prospects for ending many of the wars currently raging across the world are not good. The prospects for building sustainable peace seem worse, especially in deeply fraught situations like Afghanistan, Haiti and Israel-Palestine, and even in cases of relative success like Guatemala and Mozambique. In the former there are narrow spaces for nurturing the democratic governance and socio-economic reforms required to build lasting peace. In the latter the spaces for social inclusion and conflict transformation are greater, partly because they benefited from second-generation peace efforts and a more enabling international environment in the 1990s. The possibilities for using these different spaces depend largely on national change agents' ability to forge new coalitions that include local stakeholders and international agencies as long-term allies.

To illustrate these trends the paper provides brief sketches of peacebuilding in the six societies in which WKOP partners are conducting case studies and policy dialogue. The propositions advanced in this paper are being tested and enriched through the case studies. These will be published in a book with the final conclusions in 2006. In the meantime we are sharing this working paper, the draft case studies and eight national policy briefs to stimulate the informed debate and action. Both are urgently needed if we are to rescue the project of peacebuilding from the drift towards more forceful, externally-driven and apparently less sustainable interventions in the post-9/11 era.

“What change will peace bring us? What is to be expected from this peace?”

Jean-Paul Lederach, 1999  
echoing stakeholder voices

“...women’s perspectives tend to privilege the notion of a ‘just’ peace, as defined from the perspective of the discriminated and disempowered ...”

Rita Manchanda, 2001

If people are denied the fruits of peace – such as shelter, education, health care and employment – sustainable peace will be much harder to achieve.”

Jan Egeland, 2004

## **Introduction**

The uneven outcomes of the September 2005 UN General Assembly debates on the implementation of the Millennium Declaration reflect the current state of international affairs on many issues. On matters related to peacebuilding, speakers from across the globe stressed the need for increased investment in rebuilding societies after wars, and enhanced UN capacities to coordinate such efforts. Some member states linked this to the importance of renewing efforts to transform the attitudes and institutions that generate armed violence. Others drew the links between sustainable peacebuilding, respect for human rights, equitable development and the prevention of armed conflicts.

In the end member states and UN officials agreed to establish a Peacebuilding Commission to coordinate international efforts overall and in priority countries. They agreed to establish a Voluntary Fund for Peacebuilding to stabilize financing for such efforts, and a Peacebuilding Support Office in the UN Secretariat. Though the outcome document also included general statements on conflict prevention and the responsibility to protect (R2P), it avoided making any operational connections between those issues and new UN mechanisms to enhance peacebuilding.

The broad support for the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission and related mechanisms reflects the recognition that it is in most states’ interest to strengthen international efforts to rebuild societies damaged by war. It represents a qualified vote of confidence for UN leadership in this domain, and a clear reminder that UN agencies must work better with others – including host governments and civil society organizations, regional bodies and international financial institutions – to secure peace. But this and the much more cautious reaction to R2P also reflect widespread disquiet about controversial unilateral military interventions, particularly in Iraq, and dissatisfaction with the international community’s inability to consolidate peace in societies as diverse as Haiti and the Palestinian Territories. The sketch of peacebuilding efforts in the Palestinian Territories, below, shows how these concerns are playing out in a particularly challenging context.

*Peacebuilding in the Palestinian Territories<sup>1</sup>*

The 1993 and 1995 Oslo Peace Accords initially brought significant peace dividends to Palestinians and Israelis:

- Israel withdrew from parts of the occupied territories, and Palestinians curtailed their attacks on Israeli targets.
- The Palestinian Liberation Organization returned to establish the Palestinian Authority, including holding elections for the Legislative Council.
- The economy grew at an average of 5% per year between 1995 and 2000.

Yet flaws in the Accords and in their implementation sewed the seeds of failure:

- The Executive branch and the PLO old guard maintained control over power, resisted demands for accountability to the Legislative Council and the Judiciary, and put off demands to incorporate opposition movements through local elections.
- The interim nature of the peace agreements, as well as their tendency to privilege the short-term security priorities of Israel and the PLO old guard, converged to undermine human rights and democratic development over the longer term.
- The international community was unable to deploy peacekeepers or observers due to opposition by the government of Israel and US support for that position.
- This was the background to second Intifada in 2000. Renewed violence and re-occupation drove the economy into recession, narrowed democratic spaces and fuelled the popularity of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the PLO nationalist new guard.
- The current unilateral Israeli disengagement process, the security wall and continued Israeli settlement on the West Bank perpetuate these tendencies.

Current efforts that deserve more support include:

- The phased local elections that began in December 2004 and are due to culminate in December 2005. Reforms underway to ensure free and fair Legislative Council elections could also yield fruit in early 2006.
- Attempts to revive the Quartet Roadmap talks and move toward a permanent status agreement that addresses fundamental issues.

Will these developments lead to peace? According to the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research: "... little progress is possible without solid international intervention; yet successful Palestinian peacebuilding is more likely a mission impossible for the international community of the ... post 9/11 era."

Though it is unique, the situation in Israel and Palestine begs pressing questions about the global record of peacebuilding. Is it true that many other efforts are also failing to deliver on the goal of conflict prevention? Why does it seem so difficult to parlay short-term measures into the longer-term transformations required to sustain peace and prevent war? What combination of local, national and international strategies can bridge enduring peacebuilding deficits? What parts of the agenda of transformation are feasible in different contexts? How has the trend towards international military intervention affected peacebuilding efforts? In brief, what kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era?

These are the core questions that a group of researcher-practitioners has been grappling with since 2003, in the “What Kind of Peace is Possible?” (WKOP) project. Through WKOP we have conducted research and engaged stakeholders in policy dialogue on the difficulties/possibilities for long-term, sustainable peacebuilding in six different contexts. Southern partners have led this work in Guatemala and Mozambique, two cases where relative success can be already observed over the long term. National institutions have led this work in Haiti and the Palestinian Territories, two cases where failure during the 1990s has led to renewed efforts to advance transitional processes. Southern partners have also led this effort in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, where distinct peace efforts are in their early stages. Working with thinktanks in Canada and Norway, these colleagues have examined the relationships between efforts in their countries and global processes.

We have focused on two aspects of peacebuilding: democratic governance and economic development, not because they are the only important dimensions but because they seem central to the end goal of sustainability. Our research has looked at peacebuilding at the national and local levels, with a particular concern for national agency and social inclusion, including gender equality. Our Norwegian partners have paid special attention to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes on the assumption that the tensions observed in other areas – for example between short-term expediency and long-term sustainability – are also worrisome in DDR processes.

This working paper is a revised version of the draft that guided the case studies and initial policy dialogue efforts. It reviews global policy debates on peacebuilding and related issues such as fragile states. It then delves into debates on the democratic governance and economic dimensions of peacebuilding. It previews the case studies through sketches, and highlights ten propositions that are examined in the research. The case studies, conclusions and several new papers generated by the project will be published as a book in 2006. In the meantime we are circulating this working paper, the case studies and eight national policy briefs to stimulate informed action by stakeholders in the North and South. Our emphasis is on action for it is our belief that, despite the events of September 11, 2001 and many problematic trends since then, there is still space for sustainable peacebuilding. Stakeholders committed to transformation – within host governments, civil society organizations including those representing women and the poor, as well as champions of reform in international agencies – could form more effective transnational coalitions to push the envelope on deeper reforms. This paper offers a fresh perspective how this could be done, at least in certain societies, and on what kind of peace might be possible in the post-9/11 era should we chose to act in concert.

## Peacebuilding since 1989

Drawing on distinctions made by analysts of UN peace operations, we divide the evolution of peacebuilding since the end of the Cold War into three types: “second-generation” multidimensional peacebuilding tied mostly to negotiated peace agreements in the early 1990s; more robust but still multilateral peace “third generation” operations increasing in the late 1990s; and even more forceful and unilateral “fourth generation” interventions since 9/11.<sup>ii</sup> These generations have overlapped, several types coexist today, and movement from one to another has not necessarily yielded better outcomes. Before exploring this last observation in more depth, let us elaborate on the trend itself.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War generated much optimism about the possibilities for resolving wars that had been fueled by the East-West rivalry. Against that backdrop, from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s a series of ambitious peace operations were carried out in Namibia, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mozambique, Cambodia, Angola, Guatemala and Bosnia. Despite their differences, these operations had certain common characteristics. Most derived their mandates from internationally-mediated negotiations between national parties. Peace agreements were verified by multilateral peace-keeping and civilian observer missions. They involved coordinated reconstruction encompassing the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration of ex-combatants; the voluntary resettlement of refugees and internally-displaced persons; demining; institutional reforms to promote human rights and democratic governance, and sometimes truth and reconciliation processes. In keeping with the triumph of the West in the great contest of the Cold War, peacebuilding also included macro-economic and fiscal reforms to establish a market-oriented environment conducive to reconstruction.

The policy rationale underpinning this first type of post-Cold War peace operations – dubbed “second generation peace operations” because their multi-dimensional mandates and capabilities went far beyond classical Cold War UN peacekeeping -- was codified in key multilateral documents such as the UN Secretary-General’s 1992 *Agenda for Peace* and the 1997 OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) *Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation*. Scholars such as Roland Paris have suggested that this rationale could be described as “liberal peacebuilding” because it rested on classical liberal assumptions about the benefits of multiparty democracy, free markets and international cooperation as solutions to problems of violent conflict.<sup>iii</sup>

Two additional dimensions of this policy framework are worth highlighting. First, although the UN and the northern donors grouped in the DAC assumed that the international community had key roles to play in each phase of peace processes, they recognized that these processes would only be successful if they were owned by national actors over the long run. Second, while this approach tended to focus on the challenge of “bridging the relief-to-development” gap in the initial postwar years, there was a belief that peace could only be sustained through a transformation of the institutions and attitudes that had caused or at least fueled war. That is, it was acknowledged that peace could only be consolidated through reforms to the markets, political, judicial, security and other institutions, as well as the worldviews of key actors in war-torn societies.

Despite the apparent successes of this type of post-Cold War peace operations, by the mid-1990s there was an emerging belief that negotiated solutions might not be possible in some contexts, and that military intervention may sometimes be required to create the conditions for peace. The establishment of a safe haven for Kurds in northern Iraq and the 1994 intervention in Haiti were precursors to this trend. In turn, the failure of national authorities and the international community to protect civilians from massive human rights violations in Bosnia and Rwanda spurred a profound rethinking of what is required to protect people and promote peace. By the time violence escalated in East Timor and Kosovo in early 1999, some governments and multilateral organizations were ready to deploy forces for protect purposes. These efforts were dubbed “third generation peace operations” or “peace enforcement operations” because they involved the use of force in ways that departed significantly from the classical UN peacekeeping norm of consent. The tools of liberal peacebuilding were used to reactivate the economy and nurture democratic institutions, with the difference that state-like entities were also being built in Timor Leste and in Kosovo. In the next section we will see how these experiences were linked to the emergence of new thinking on civilian protection and on state building.

The US-led invasion of Afghanistan, shortly after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, was an extension of this trend towards forceful intervention but it was distinct in several respects. That intervention was justified on the grounds of self-defense; moreover it was only endorsed by the UN Security Council and justified on humanitarian grounds after the fact. The US-led intervention in Iraq two years later was initially justified as pre-emptive self-defense, and was never fully sanctioned by the UN Security Council. In Afghanistan the invading forces allowed the UN and the new national authorities to lead in rebuilding the country and forging longer-term governance arrangements, though the US kept control over military operations in the countryside. In Iraq the occupying powers remained in almost complete control of public life until their partial handover to the Interim Government in June 2004. One could characterize the interventions in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq as a new phase of much more forceful, unilateral military intervention and attempts to build peace under conditions of continued warfare. One can use the label “fourth generation peace operations” to characterize these experiences, though the occupation of Iraq should probably not be associated with the concept of “peace” at all. These new operations coexist with efforts that belong to earlier phases – such as the UN Mission in Sudan, which fits the second generation mould, and the African Union Mission in Sudan, which fits the third generation model.

In sum since 1989 there has been an increase in the use of force, external leadership and unilateralism, and a decrease in negotiated peace processes, national ownership and multilateralism in peacebuilding efforts. It is tempting for those concerned about the more problematic aspects of fourth generation interventions to look back on the early 1990s as the golden age of peacebuilding. Yet is it important to have a less romantic analysis of second generation operations. Three patterns are important in this regard. First, many of those operations brought wars to an end but some did not secure even that minimal aim: for example Angola returned to war despite major peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts, and we have seen how conflict re-emerged in Israel and Palestine despite the Oslo Accords and extensive peacebuilding activities.

Second, even cases where wars have been terminated, it has proven difficult to move from this state to the deeper institutional and structural reforms many see as necessary for sustainable peacebuilding. Third, negotiated peacekeeping and peacebuilding did not provide immediate answers to the challenge of protection in situations of massive human rights violations such as Rwanda in 1994. We will discuss the third pattern in the next section. For now, let us examine the first two patterns.

Parallel to the evolution of peacebuilding in practice several literatures emerged that analyzed those experiences. In the mid-1990s several comparative studies concluded that what distinguished cases of successful war termination like El Salvador from cases of failure like Angola was the level of international engagement as well as the presence or absence of “spoilers” – namely powerful actors opposed to peacebuilding on the ground.<sup>iv</sup> These studies were followed by larger quantitative and comparative studies. One of the most comprehensive studies, coordinated by the International Peace Academy (IPA), concluded that two basic categories of factors shape outcomes: characteristics of the implementation environment on the ground, especially the character of spoilers, spoils and the policies of neighbouring states; and the approaches of international actors, namely their strategies, resource commitments and incentives, particularly their security interests. The IPA study suggested that the likelihood of success – defined in terms of war termination – was greatest where an enabling environment on the ground converged with the vital security interests of external actors, and led the latter to commit significant military and financial assets to peace operations. This research also led the authors to conclude that international actors should give priority to measures like DDR and security sector reform in the short run, and secondarily to human rights protection and reconciliation, if they wanted to lay foundations for lasting peace.<sup>v</sup>

These studies have made enormous contributions to our understanding of peacebuilding. They have unpacked the interplay of certain conditions on the ground, and international engagement, in shaping degrees of success/failure. They have yielded pointed policy recommendations for international actors, particularly on short-term priorities. Yet there are striking limits to this literature. First, it rests on short-term, minimalist criteria of success, namely war termination that outlasts the departure of most international actors and the holding of one or two elections. This begs the question of whether these benchmarks are satisfactory to national stakeholders, and whether they are sufficient to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict over the long run. Second, this literature tends to paint a simplistic picture of national actors. It enriches our understanding of “spoilers” and their reliance on spoils like diamonds, but provides few insights into the strategies of national actors on the other sides of the equation: the reformist politicians, socially-conscious businesspersons or community-based organizations crucial to the construction of peace in certain contexts. Third, by downplaying the positive agency of national actors, this literature sheds little light on policy options for national agents of change or on the transnational alliances that could foster durable peace. Finally, this literature is dominated by northern scholars. This does not invalidate its intellectual merits but it does raise questions of perspective, of whether analysts living closer to the front lines of peacebuilding might provide fresh insights into issues like the agency of national actors, their strategic options, and sensible criteria for assessing peacebuilding over longer run.

Other literatures are beginning to fill these gaps. A strand of thinking rooted in Johan Galtung's seminal distinction between "positive and negative peace" suggests that peace processes which do not address the deep causes of conflict will often lead to the recurrence of violence over the long run. John Paul Lederach, for example, has cogently argued that the ultimate goal of peacebuilding should be "sustainable reconciliation", namely broadly-anchored, self-regenerating social processes that address the proximate and underlying causes of enmity. Time is a crucial dimension: peacebuilding should link action on immediate priorities like ceasefires and DDR with action on institutional change during the first decade and longer-term structural and attitudinal transformation over the course of one or more generations. The prospects for building sustainable reconciliation are also enhanced by linking the engagement of top-level leaders such as military and political authorities, middle-level leaders such as religious officials and national NGOs, and grassroots-level institutions represented by municipal officials or community leaders. It is by linking these levels of society through "peace infrastructures" over the long-term that the recurrence of violent conflict can be prevented. This requires integrated approaches: "... a multiplicity of roles ... multiple levels of activity ... diverse strategies and approaches, each with a distinctive contribution to make."<sup>vi</sup>

A literature review by Alejandro Bendaña has documented southern contributions to this thinking. It notes the work of African analysts such as Laurie Nathan and Yash Tandon, who have cogently argued that international peacebuilding efforts have paid too little attention to the structural causes of violence within African societies, or to the international drivers of conflict such as trade liberalization and market-oriented structural adjustment. Similarly, in 2000 a group of prominent Central American analysts concluded that crucial reforms – particularly in the realms of economic, social and agrarian policy – tended to drop off peacebuilding agendas due to the convergence of national elites' and international agencies' other priorities. Asian analysts such as Jayadeva Uyangoda have also made compelling arguments about the need for more attention to the structural underpinnings of, and solutions to armed violence.<sup>vii</sup>

Bendaña stressed the coincidence between these perspective and feminist approaches, given the emphasis of the latter on just peace and social transformation. A recent study by the International Center for Research on Women (CRW) confirms that there have been dramatic advances at the interface of gender and peace work.<sup>viii</sup> After decades of activism and scholarship on the experiences of women as victims of war and agents of peace, in the late 1990s many northern governments and multilateral agencies began to enshrine commitments to gender mainstreaming in their peacebuilding and conflict prevention policies. This culminated in the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, peace and security in 2000, committing the UN and member states to implementing gender-sensitive approaches to peace-making, peace-keeping, peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Reports on the implementation of UNSC 1325 have concluded that much has been done to follow up on 1325. This includes increased participation by women in official peace negotiations and peace implementation processes in several countries; the adoption of new international norms; enhanced gender training for military and police peace observers; and the prosecution of those guilty of grave human rights violations against women in certain contexts.

Much remains to be done to implement the focused agenda of resolution 1325. Yet as noted by CRW, there has been even less movement on the broader agenda of social transformation. That agenda includes addressing power, its unequal distribution across gender, class and other social divides, and the consequences of these power imbalances for peace. It includes transforming local and national political institutions to enable women and men to negotiate their interests in peaceful ways, based on respect for universal human rights. It includes contesting the prevalence of masculine identities that emphasize violence and domination, and working to replace them with identities more open to negotiation and cooperation. Despite compelling arguments by feminist activists that “sustainable peace also requires a more permanent transformation of social norms around violence, gender, and power”, this broader agenda has received little official attention in international institutions or in most peace processes.<sup>ix</sup>

Clearly this broader agenda of transformation begs profound questions about what is necessary to sustain peace, what is possible and how one might forge transformative coalitions in concrete situations. A striking pattern in this literature is the poverty of debate between minimalists who prioritize measures to secure war termination, and maximalists who argue that broader transformations are necessary to consolidate peace and prevent the recurrence of war. Minimalists tend to downplay long term challenges. Maximalists have not looked carefully at the obstacles facing the broader agenda of transformation, or the options available for advancing that agenda in different contexts.

One aim of the WKOP project has been to build bridges between these perspectives and help the peacebuilding community move beyond unproductive mini/max dichotomies. Drawing on our initial research and dialogue, we advance the following propositions as building blocks for a bridge between minimalist and maximalist perspectives.

**Proposition 1:** It is fair to assess postwar peacebuilding efforts in the first 10 years primarily according to whether they have helped end wars. Yet it is important to assess longer-term peacebuilding efforts, over periods of 10-25 years, according to whether they are addressing the causes of conflict and are leading to sustainable peacebuilding.

**Proposition 2:** Multi-dimensional peacebuilding has contributed much to ending several wars since 1989, yet a major limitation of these efforts is that few have paved the way for deeper reforms required to sustain peace.

**Proposition 3:** The termination of these wars was due to a convergence of key domestic stakeholders’ interests with those of major international actors. Yet it has been difficult to forge the transnational coalitions required to underpin more profound changes – such as deepening democratic practices at the local level – over the long term.

**Proposition 4:** Multi-dimensional peacebuilding provides a framework for nurturing transnational coalitions – or peace infrastructures – linking agents of change from the local to the national and international levels. Yet stakeholders should invest much more to build the domestic base of these coalitions and deliver the institutional reforms required to extend their life well beyond the departure of major international actors.

These propositions and those that follow in other sections of this paper are currently being explored in each case study. The box on Guatemala below provides a glimpse into how these dynamics are playing out in a case of “relative success”.

*The “relative success” of peacebuilding in Guatemala<sup>x</sup>*

Peacebuilding has brought enormous benefits to this Central American country since the final peace accords were signed in December 1996. These include:

- War termination and the demobilization of about 25,000 ex-Armed Forces and 1,000 guerrilla ex-combatants.
- A consolidation of democratic electoral processes, and new laws to decrease the exclusion of indigenous peoples.
- Advances in decentralization through revived Development Councils.

Yet key peace accord commitments have not been implemented:

- Successive legislatures have failed to pass peace accord laws in key areas like fiscal reform and the regularization of indigenous peoples’ lands.
- Minimal tax reforms were not implemented and public expenditures have not been redistributed from security to social priorities like health and education.
- Decentralization remains limited in practice. Increased participation by women and indigenous peoples has not yet led to their influence on major local decisions.

This mixed record is due to a number of factors:

- The peace accords and their partial implementation were due to the converging strategies of reformist elites in government, guerrilla leaders, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the international community led by the UN. It was also due to the temporary disorganization of domestic conservative networks.
- The latter – elements in Congress and the Judiciary, parts of the domestic corporate sector, and former members of the civil defense patrols – regrouped to resist the implementation of the more far-reaching peacebuilding commitments.

The peace process could still lead to sustainable peace if the Berger Government:

- Works with Congress to adopt legislation codifying key peace commitments.
- Renews efforts to raise taxation levels and generate the national resources needed to finance pending commitments in areas like rural development.
- Supports efforts by the Development Councils to contribute to peacebuilding by nurturing their capacities for revenue generation and public engagement.

Development Councils and CSOs should formulate clearer strategies to secure the implementation of pending peace accords. The international community should continue supporting agents of change in the government, the councils and CSOs who contribute to these measures and to the agenda of sustainable peacebuilding.

## Conflict prevention, R2P and fragile states

From the mid-1990s onward three new streams of policy thinking emerged, drawing on but also challenging the international discourse on postwar peacebuilding. Starting with the Carnegie Commission's seminal report on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict, influential international actors began to advocate a "shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention". The rationale behind this effort was that the international community could no longer afford to wait for massive human rights violations or wars to exact their toll before engaging in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Diplomacy or "operational prevention" and institutional reforms or "structural prevention" should be initiated way before conflicts escalated into massive violence, both to save precious lives and to use scarce resources more efficiently.<sup>xi</sup>

This new thinking was reflected in the 1997 OECD DAC Guidelines and even more so in their 2001 Supplement, but it was also codified in key multilateral statements such as the Miyazaki Initiative of the G8, the United Nations Millennium Declaration and the UN Secretary-General's 2001 *Report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict*.<sup>xii</sup> These all contained commitments to adopt diplomatic and other measures to prevent the escalation of conflicts into wars. Some also advocated the use of multilaterally-sanctioned force where necessary to protect vulnerable populations from grave human rights violations. All reiterated commitments to rebuild societies after wars, address the structural underpinnings of conflict and thereby prevent the recurrence of armed violence.

These commitments were followed up with practical measures to strengthen the early warning and preventative diplomacy capacities of multilateral institutions, and to mainstream conflict prevention in the programming of official development agencies.<sup>xiii</sup> The Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) brought together many of the NGOs and other civil society actors that also took up this banner.<sup>xiv</sup>

From the outset work on conflict prevention was intimately linked to debates on humanitarian intervention. That debate has ancient roots but it was revived by the tragedies in Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s. Widespread frustration over the inability of the United Nations, regional organizations and great powers to protect victims from genocide and ethnic cleansing led some to call for the development on new international norms and capacities for humanitarian intervention. In 1999 important precedents were set when NATO intervened to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and Australia led a multinational force to stop another genocide in East Timor. The peacebuilding efforts that followed these interventions are quintessential "third generation" peace operations.

The international divisions over intervention in Kosovo reflected the enduring difficulties of instituting new norms and protection capacities through the UN. In response the Canadian government and other actors convened the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) to bridge the gulf between those advocating humanitarian intervention and those defending the sanctity of state sovereignty. In late 2001 the Commission released *The Responsibility to Protect* report, recognizing that sovereignty includes the responsibility of states to protect their citizens from massive

human rights violations such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. When states fail to live up to this duty, the international community has a responsibility to protect populations at risk. “R2P” includes the responsibility to react militarily, in a proportionate manner, when all other options have been exhausted. It includes the obligation to seek and obtain authorization by the UN Security Council, to demonstrate “right intention” and reasonable prospects of success. R2P also encompasses the responsibility to help rebuild societies affected by war in ways that address the causes of conflict, and the responsibility to prevent the escalation of conflict into armed violence. Indeed, “Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect.”<sup>xv</sup>

The ICISS report suffered enormously from being released shortly after the September 11, 2001 tragedy. As a result its recommendations were ignored by decision-makers in the United States as they became consumed with the counter-attack against Al Qaeda and its Afghani hosts, with the broader “war on terror” and with the hunt for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. After the occupation of Iraq many other governments and publics became even more suspicious of any doctrine that could be used to justify ill-conceived northern-led military interventions. This unfortunate historical linkage is one reason why it has been so difficult to obtain broad support for R2P in the United Nations.<sup>xvi</sup>

While 9/11 and its aftermath overshadowed the R2P effort, the role that the Afghan state played in harbouring Al Qaeda galvanized international interest in the phenomena of failed/weak/fragile or crisis states. That shift was driven by events in the United States. A year after 9/11 the Bush Administration tabled a National Security Strategy identifying failed states as a major security threat. It outlined a strategy to combat terrorism and the emergence of power vacuums that could be exploited by transnational terrorist networks. The document framed regime change and nation-building as essential complements to the doctrine of pre-emptive defense.<sup>xvii</sup> Since then the Bush Administration has taken many initiatives to address the problem of failed states in particular countries and globally.

Official development assistance (ODA) agencies were already grappling with problems of state fragility when this cause was taken up by the Bush Administration. ODA debates were driven by peacebuilding and conflict prevention units concerned about their agencies’ apparent embrace of the aid effectiveness agenda. Indeed the drive to enhance ODA and debt relief for countries that showed the will and capacity to use resources effectively -- the so-called “good performers” on the development stage – begged profound questions about what to do with the “poor performers”. Throughout the 1990s peacebuilding units had advocated that donors should not simply cut ODA or increase their humanitarian aid in countries drifting towards collapse. They had championed the view that “working around conflict” was morally unacceptable and politically undesirable since it could fuel humanitarian crises, aggravate governance challenges and spur the regionalization of conflicts.<sup>xviii</sup> Renewed interest in fragile states provided fresh justifications for investing in poor performers despite the logic of aid effectiveness.

Since 9/11 development agencies have elaborated on this rationale through the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Learning and Advisory Process on “difficult partnerships” and the World Bank’s Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS)

initiative. Through the DAC they have drafted Principles of Good International Engagement in Fragile States, stipulating that donors should share and fine-tune ongoing context analysis in such contexts; maintain activities in support of the poor, such as social service delivery, through appropriate governmental and non-governmental channels; promote change by supporting reformers within and outside the state; strengthen donor coordination and promote broader policy coherence.<sup>xix</sup> These principles are currently being tested in several fragile states including Haiti and Sudan.

These processes in the US and among other donors have been informed by a stream of scholarly analysis that emerged in the mid-1990s.<sup>xx</sup> That literature unpacked the continuum of state failure ranging from “failed states” that are unable to provide the most basic public goods to their citizens (such as public security and basic education) to “capable states” that provide these services and more to most of their citizens. It suggested that many states in the developing world sit between these extremes as “fragile” states. The literature catalogued the causes of state failure, from the legacy of colonialism to the impacts of the Cold War, the poor policy choices of governments in some developing countries, inequitable international financial regimes, etc. It identified international policy options ranging from preventative diplomacy to developmental approaches. Many of these analyses have converged around the need to promote better governance – or state building -- in fragile states. For some this means focusing on establishing the rule of law and democratic governance. For others it should also include promoting socio-economic reforms to help states ensure the basic rights of their citizens to adequate livelihoods, health, education and gender equity. Some analysts have also begun to reexamine the role of that national agents can play in responding to state failure.

Post-intervention stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq are testing grounds for fourth generation peace operations and approaches in fragile states. One problem is that the strategic interests of major Western powers – and not R2P criteria like massive human rights violations – drove decisions to intervene in these cases. Another is that initial peacebuilding efforts have been marred by ongoing warfare. Iraq is the high-profile case in this regard, yet peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Haiti are also compromised by continued war-fighting, de facto collaboration with paramilitary leaders responsible for past human rights violations, and the difficulties of consolidating democratic, gender-inclusive and participatory development processes particularly in the countryside.<sup>xxi</sup> The sketch of the situation in Haiti in the box below illustrates the complexities of fourth generation peacebuilding in the current context.

In sum, the debates on conflict prevention, R2P and state fragility have usefully broadened international agendas beyond postwar peacebuilding to address issues of human rights violations, conflict and vulnerability at earlier stages. The most visionary policy prescriptions such as the ICISS and UN High-Level Panel reports advocate an integrated approach to these problems, from immediate diplomatic responses to the carefully-circumscribed use of force and longer-term support for governance and socio-economic reforms. Some policy prescriptions place considerable emphasis on strengthening national change agents. The events of 9/11 have certainly pushed issues of state fragility up the international agenda in a way that proponents of R2P can only envy.

Yet in practice, these discourses have three major flaws that are related to the challenges of sustainable peacebuilding. First, there has been uneven follow-up on the comprehensive agenda, particularly on R2P and fragile states. Champions of R2P such as the government of Canada have focused on advancing norms to govern the use of force, and only began to re-connect this with the prevention and rebuilding pillars after much (difficult) dialogue with NGOs. Some Western governments' practical responses also betray a bias towards military intervention and much less interest in programming for long-term conflict prevention and sustainable peacebuilding, except perhaps on a narrow range of governance initiatives. Sustaining senior officials' interest in less fashionable aspects of prevention and peacebuilding – such as institutional reforms to promote the inclusion of the poor and gender equality – is proving to be difficult in the new “whole-of-government” environment. The United States is clearly the extreme case here, but others such as Canada are also falling into these patterns in disturbing ways.<sup>xxii</sup>

Second, the complex links between R2P, the discourse on fragile states and the selective use of force by Western powers have deeply undermined Western credibility. The unilateral intervention against Iraq and the use of the failed state label to describe a repressive but hardly weak state dismantled by external intervention, has had a huge negative impact on the R2P and fragile states debates. The West's unwillingness or inability to respond adequately to the resurgence of massive violence in Israel and Palestine has also undermined its credibility. The Canadian government's justification for the 2004 intervention in Haiti, without open debate from an R2P perspective, has also damaged the R2P campaign, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Third, even more than postwar peacebuilding, these debates are dominated by northern officials and analysts. The number of sophisticated southern interlocutors on conflict prevention and R2P has grown in recent years, particularly in Africa given the urgency of these issues on the continent. Yet especially on fragile states, debates and policy initiatives are still driven by northern governments and informed by North-based analysts. As with the work on peacebuilding, this does not invalidate these discourses, but it does raise questions about what southern interlocutors might contribute to these debates, for example to understanding the possibilities for positive southern agency in counter-acting very real problems like genocide and different states of fragility.

In response to the mixed outcomes of work on conflict prevention, R2P and fragile states, we will explore the following additional propositions in the WKOP studies:

**Proposition 5:** The outcomes of 3<sup>rd</sup> and especially 4<sup>th</sup> generation peacebuilding efforts are even more problematic than those of 2<sup>nd</sup> generation operations from the standpoint of sustainable peacebuilding. This is partly due to the mixed international motives that have tended to drive such operations, despite the ideals of the R2P discourse. It is also due to the unpromising national and local circumstances one tends to find in situations where key stakeholders are excluded by warfare and/or by limited negotiations.

**Proposition 6:** Even in such situations peacebuilding can move toward a more solid footing by engaging a broader range of stakeholders, including leaders of the poor,

women or ethnic groups that have been excluded from transitional arrangements. Addressing these groups' legitimate political, socio-economic or cultural demands through serious reforms will also help reposition peacebuilding efforts. Decisive movement towards the use of force as a last resort, clearly based on the rule of law, is also a necessary ingredient for recovering ground lost during contested interventions.

*Haiti and peacebuilding in a fragile state<sup>xxiii</sup>*

The first peacebuilding effort in Haiti began in 1994, with the return of the elected President on the heels of an international military intervention. The return of President Aristide and the support he enjoyed opened the door to many reforms including:

- The dismantling of the Haitian Armed Forces and establishment of a National Civilian Police.
- The establishment of a multi-party political system and widening of spaces for the free expression of different political options.
- The reduction of tariffs and privatization of many public enterprises.
- Efforts to promote decentralized local development.

Yet a decade later the state, its social supports and international backing had all but evaporated. The failures of peacebuilding included:

- The subordination of state institutions such as the Electoral Council, the Judiciary and the Police, to the goal of keeping the second Aristide government in power.
- The near-collapse of the economy due to the convergence of market-oriented reforms that failed to generate growth or reduce poverty, a profound fiscal crisis and the withdrawal of most external financial assistance.
- The resurgence of widespread human rights violations.

In March 2004 the United States, France and Canada coordinated a military intervention that sealed President Aristide's removal from power. Within months the Multilateral Intervention Force was replaced by the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The situation has been characterized by several contradictory trends since:

- The elaboration of an Interim Cooperation Framework and its partial implementation with the inflow of sizeable international assistance.
- Attempts to reform security agencies in the context of escalating violence, illegal paramilitary activities and human rights violations, particularly in late 2004.
- Efforts to hold national elections scheduled for November 2005, potentially compromised by serious problems with voter registration and by the non-participation of elements in the Parti Lavalas.
- Attempts to revive promising local development efforts across the country.

## Democratic governance and its local dimensions

From the outset of the post-Cold War years there was a widespread belief that democratic governance was a key component of peacebuilding. In some war-affected societies this was driven by opposition parties that had fought for access to state power or for a new social compact between elites and other citizens.<sup>xxiv</sup> In others this was driven by actors who viewed multi-party parliamentary systems, independent electoral commissions and judiciaries, human rights ombudspersons or elected local governments as essential for the peaceful management of social differences.<sup>xxv</sup> International commitments to nurture democratic institutions were codified in policy statements by the UN, the OECD DAC and key regional organizations. Numerous official and NGO cooperation programs were initiated in this domain. Other aspects of governance such as accountability and transparency also receive considerable international attention, especially from the international financial institutions. Yet democratic governance has continued to move up international agendas in recent years, fuelled in ambiguous ways by post-9/11 preoccupations with the war on terror.

These trends have also connected with a growing interest in democratic governance at the local level. Local democratization is seen by some as being critical to the success of peacebuilding, since local participation and state accountability seem essential for a culture of peace to take root beyond capital cities. Bearing this rationale in mind, experience suggests that local democratization can bring gains but can also aggravate conflicts. Enabling national policies and programming are crucial to maximize peacebuilding benefits. Enabling policies and programs include devolving decision-making authority and taxation powers to back up the decentralization of responsibilities for the delivery of public goods; and building the capacity of local institutions to manage services, nurture stakeholder participation, resolve local conflicts and negotiate relations with higher-level authorities is also essential. Programming in this area requires a thorough, conflict-sensitive analysis of local actors, needs and contexts.<sup>xxvi</sup>

A rich literature that assesses the results of democratization efforts in postwar contexts is beginning to accumulate. In his seminal work on this issue, Paris cogently argued that the hasty promotion of elections and superficial institutional changes can actually destabilize fragile peace processes, particularly when combined with economic liberalization.<sup>xxvii</sup> At the sectoral level, an eight-country study by the Netherlands Institute for International Relations has concluded that international democracy assistance tends to cluster around a limited menu of electoral and human rights assistance, that short-term projects tend to proliferate at the expense of institution building, and that despite a growth of governance assistance budgets, international funding falls dramatically short of what is required for long-term democratic development. The preference for technical assistance projects has also prevented donors from addressing political obstacles at the national level.<sup>xxviii</sup>

Other studies have looked at these dynamics at the local level. Based on a comparative analysis of experiences in Bosnia, the Palestinian Occupied Territories and the Philippines, Bush has stressed the importance of local champions, institutional capacities including the capacity to engage civil society organizations, supportive national policies

(such as real fiscal de-centralization) and international assistance for local democratization to take root in postwar contexts. Above all he emphasizes the importance of having realistic timeframes because peacebuilding “takes a long, long time.”<sup>xxxix</sup>

Focusing on the politics of local peacebuilding, Woodward recently concluded that “In all cases for which there are field studies, decentralization programs were donor-driven.”<sup>xxx</sup> Donors often have conflicting agendas -- ranging from limiting the power of the state to reducing public expenditures to broadening democratic participation. National and local stakeholders also have mixed motives for supporting or resisting de-centralization. Some national leaders use de-centralization to undercut the political bases of their rivals, while others use de-centralization and privatization to accumulate state assets at bargain-basement prices. Some national leaders will resist de-centralization because they fear the collapse of the unitary state or the loss of power (and revenues) to local rivals. The level to which power and funds are decentralized is often contested.

Carrie Manning has offered a framework for thinking about local-level peacebuilding that emphasizes the importance of the state across national territories, beyond the capital; the interaction of different levels of government, and different stakeholders, through these levels and the “myriad negotiations” that shape peace on the ground.<sup>xxxi</sup> Within this framework, Manning divided challenges to local peacebuilding into two categories. Centrally-driven obstacles include national leaders who try to recoup ground lost in peace negotiations by treating local spaces as reserve domains of power (for example extreme nationalist Serb parties in Bosnia); vague peace agreements; major actors who want to control territory in order to extract resources and make money (for example UNITA in Angola). Locally-generated obstacles include local officials who stand to lose office, revenues or impunity from reforms; this in contexts where there are often few livelihood alternatives. Yet – borrowing an insight from the recent scholarship on federalism – Manning concluded that the need to negotiate peacebuilding among actors at different levels also opens up important possibilities to foster more sustainable peace outcomes.

In Sri Lanka a group of researchers recently explored how devolution could open spaces for advancing rights and self-determination at the local level. They concluded that this would require further devolution of mandates and resources to local-level administrators, something which has been resisted historically by bureaucrats from all ethnic communities. Without romanticizing local spaces, they documented rich experiences of community-level conflict resolution, multicultural coexistence and development cooperation. Strengthening these experiences requires state reform and project interventions. “If project interventions are to be part of a peace agenda that includes substantive democracy by strengthening local capacities”, they argue, “more attention would have to be given to the analysis of local politics and local knowledge.”<sup>xxxii</sup> State reform should include complementary strengthening of local and national capacities to deliver public goods and accountability to their constituencies.

The sketch of democratic development in Mozambique below, provides a sense of how these dynamics are unfolding in a relatively promising peacebuilding context.

*Democratization, decentralization and peacebuilding in Mozambique*<sup>xxviii</sup>

Peacebuilding has brought enormous benefits since the war ended in 1992:

- Three free and fair national elections have been held. The national elections in November 2004 did not generate serious incidents of violence.
- Two rounds of local elections have also occurred.

Yet certain trends could undermine peace:

- Political power remains quite concentrated in the hands of the central government and the governing FRELIMO party. The eruption of violence after the 1999 national elections, in a region with a strong RENAMO presence, highlights the links between the concentration of political power and the fragility of peace. As noted by Archbishop Jaime Gonçalves, a negotiator of the Rome Peace Accords:

The experience of the past 12 years tells us that the institutionalization of democracy in our country is yet to become a force that can guarantee sustainable peace-building in the country ... these 12 years also demonstrate that there are still a number of fragilities that have to be surpassed, one of which relates to the ways in which we organize and conduct elections, be they at the national or local levels.

- The limited character of decentralization reflects and aggravates these trends. Only 33 of 151 cities and major towns have been included in the process. The center remains reluctant to devolve significant fiscal powers (to tax and spend) to municipalities. Decentralization has been a top-down process controlled by FRELIMO and the central state, especially in municipalities where the opposition is strong.. According to the Mayor of Nacala: “In one word there isn’t decentralization because control ... by central government remains strong and that doesn’t give the municipalities the tools to work efficiently.”
- Though women play important roles in Mozambican public life, for example through their high level of representation in the National Assembly, men continue to hold the levers of power nationally and in most municipalities.

Nonetheless, there are important opportunities emerging to advance democratic development, including at the local level:

- The World Bank is working with the Government of Mozambique to develop a decentralization strategy in 2005 and conclude a letter of sector policy in early 2006. Other donors have supported decentralization efforts, with different degrees of commitment to deepening their democratic and peacebuilding aspects.
- The new National Association of Municipalities presents an opportunity for local leaders and civil society organizations, including women’s organizations, to engage the government in a process to deepen democratic decentralization.

In sum, over the past 15 years the policy and scholarly sides of the peacebuilding community have accumulated considerable knowledge about democratic governance in postwar contexts. The belief that democratic development is central to peacebuilding has become entrenched, yet there is clearer awareness of the dilemmas and difficulties that this entails. There is much more caution about imposing superficially liberal institutions through hasty elections, and a clearer understanding of the need to develop long-term, context-specific democratic development strategies. However research suggests that donor assistance in this domain remains unstrategic, short-term and under-resourced. Moreover despite some work on national institutions, there is a need for greater comparative analysis of the types of national strategies, institutional innovations, and national political coalitions that are conducive to sustainable democratic development.

A major change in recent years has been the broadening of peacebuilding to include local-level actors as major players. There is an emerging consensus that local engagement should include efforts to strengthen the capacities of municipal governments and civil society organizations in areas like democratic governance, while fostering national legal and institutional frameworks that enable effective decentralization. There is also an emerging understanding of the political obstacles to decentralized governance, including the mixed agendas of donors and their tendency to drive these processes, and the contradictory agendas of different national actors. What is required is much greater understanding of the “politics of the possible”, namely of the types of local governance innovations that are possible in different contexts, and the political coalitions that could sustain successful strategies over the long term. It is with these insights and gaps in mind that the following additional propositions are being explored in the WKOP case studies.

**Proposition 7:** Despite the belief that democratization is essential to peacebuilding, the achievements of these processes have been quite limited in many postwar contexts, for example with regards to the participation of women, the poor and indigenous peoples in decision-making, particularly at the local level beyond capital cities.

**Proposition 8:** There are many entry points for democratic development in postwar contexts. These include fostering national legal and institutional reforms, strengthening municipal governments’ capacities for participatory policy-making, and building the capacities of historically-excluded stakeholders to influence policy processes.

### **Socio-economic development and its local dimensions**

In the late 1990s there was a revival of the old debate on the relationships between armed conflict and socio-economic development. There is broad consensus on the inverse relations between level of economic development and proneness to armed conflict: the poorer the society, the greater the likelihood that it will experience armed conflict. Yet there is little consensus on the relationship between conflict and the variable of socio-economic inequality. Drawing on large data sets some analysts have concluded that poverty and inequality lead to armed conflict where there is strong “horizontal inequality” – ie. overlap between socio-economic inequalities and ethnic, class or geographic identities that provide bases for rebellion.<sup>xxxiv</sup> Drawing on case studies others

have suggested that the strategies and capacities of state elites, versus those of opposition leaders, also mediate the links between socio-economic conditions and war.<sup>xxxv</sup>

One strand of this debate became known as the “greed and grievance debate”. Seminal publications reconceptualized contemporary wars as struggles for power and profit rather than as struggles over grand causes like social justice.<sup>xxxvi</sup> As such they argued that the key to ending these wars was to deny “spoilers” such as UNITA in Angola access to the revenues from diamond extraction, while enhancing incentives for them to lay down their arms and comply with peace agreements. Important outcomes of this work include the development of new multilateral regimes to regulate the revenues from extractive industries such as diamonds and oil. Yet recent studies have yielded more nuanced analyses of the interplay between greed and grievance. For example Ballentine and Sherman show how economic incentives combine with socio-economic or political exclusion to fuel contemporary wars. As such they conclude that the international community should still tighten belligerents’ access to natural resource revenues, while also promoting inclusive governance and socio-economic reforms that increase incentives for belligerents to lay down their arms for good.<sup>xxxvii</sup>

Paul Collier and his World Bank colleagues brought these insights together in a report on civil wars and development policy. They argued that four measures are central to preventing armed conflict: i) tightening international governance of natural resource revenues; ii) increasing aid and targeting it towards extremely poor countries at risk; iii) improving the sequencing of postwar aid, by scaling it up gradually and sustaining it over longer periods of time; and iv) using international forces to lay the foundations for peace. They suggested that national actors should: i) give priority to infrastructure rehabilitation, social investment and macro-economic growth, in that order; ii) reduce military spending, pursue security sector reform, and promote genuine democratic governance.<sup>xxxviii</sup> Although this work has attracted many followers in governmental circles, it is being criticized by others on several grounds. First, respected analysts have reviewed this research carefully and concluded that some of its arguments rest on problematic coding, deceptively small sample sizes and other shaky methodological foundations.<sup>xxxix</sup>

Second, Collier’s work does not do justice to the accumulated knowledge on how donors actually act in postwar situations. It does not acknowledge the tendency for externally-sponsored macro-economic and fiscal policies to undermine instead of reinforce peacebuilding processes. As the chief UN mediator in the peace talks in El Salvador in the early 1990s, Alvaro de Soto had observed how the peace accords he helped broker between the government and the insurgents were undermined by a structural adjustment program (SAP) negotiated between the government and the international financial institutions (IFIs). For example, the fiscal austerity measures in the SAP weakened the government’s ability to finance key commitments in the peace accords, such as the creation of a new Civil Police.<sup>xl</sup> In the late 1990s James Boyce and Susan Woodward looked at a larger number of cases to see if the international community had learned from de Soto’s critique. They observed that some donors had enhanced their ability to support national institutions and actors that are crucial to peacebuilding, and deny assistance to spoilers. Yet they concluded that despite these advances, the IFIs and some other donors

had difficulties abandoning their commitments to economic orthodoxy, even in postwar settings. Donors still tend to privilege measures to purchase short-term stability over longer-term equitable growth and to spend too much on the services of external agencies and too little on strengthening national capacities for peace.<sup>xli</sup>

These findings converge with a study on the peacebuilding programming of the original Utstein countries – Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK. That study concluded that despite many policy and institutional advances in recent years, peacebuilding programming in those countries suffers from a “major strategic deficit”.<sup>xlii</sup> It is based on short-term planning, inadequate consultation with national stakeholders, poor integration of governance and socio-economic interventions, inadequate coordination among donors as well as poor monitoring and evaluation. Indeed, “despite this considerable effort in evaluating peacebuilding activities ... there is no basis for drawing wider conclusions about ... what works and what does not in U4 peacebuilding.”<sup>xliii</sup> This finding, by four of the most active bilateral agencies in the peacebuilding community, suggests that greater changes are needed to improve donor practices than those recommended by the World Bank.

A third limitation of this literature is that it also tends to focus on international actors and their policy options. When it does look at national actors, it tends to emphasize spoilers at the expense of institutions and leaders that are or could anchor effective conflict prevention. As a literature review commissioned by the War-torn Societies Project some years ago concluded: “Discussions are primarily led by external actors and Western scholars. Subsequent recommendations are directed at international organizations involved in postconflict countries rather than at the domestic actors of reconstruction ... The focus of attention should thus shift to domestic actors and involve them in research on – and design of --- locally accepted solutions.”<sup>xliv</sup>

There are exceptions to this tendency, including the work of the War-torn Societies Project. Collier’s 2003 report certainly includes recommendations for national governments. Yet there is also a storehouse of work on the economic dimensions of peacebuilding being generated in the South. For example a consortium of Guatemalan organizations joined forces to produce the first independent assessment of the Land Fund, an institution crucial to the implementation of the land and rural development policy commitments in the peace accords. That study looked at the interplay between national institutions and international donors, and included policy recommendations that have since been taken up by both sets of actors.<sup>xlv</sup> Similarly Sri Lankan researchers have produced illuminating analyses of the tension between the previous administration’s economic and peace policies. One such study includes pointed recommendations for what the new national government and donors could do to harmonize economic policies and peacebuilding – by placing greater emphasis on equitable growth in the south, and on institutional capacity-building in the north and east.<sup>xlvi</sup>

Southern analysts are also generating insights into the contributions of local actors to economic reconstruction. For instance, a group of Sri Lankan and German scholars has examined the ways in which sub-national spaces can become arenas for non-

discriminatory and participatory approaches to reconstruction – in the rehabilitation of agricultural production or educational services, for example -- that could lay the foundations for sustainable peace. However for this to work, local, national and international agencies will have to more systematically conduct conflict impact assessment and design conflict-sensitive development interventions to avoid further dividing fragmented communities.<sup>xlvii</sup> In Guatemala, FLACSO recently published a study documenting the highly uneven capacity of local governments and indigenous peoples' organizations to administer municipal lands. As such this research highlights the potentially negative impacts of decentralizing the administration of lands without investing much more in strengthening the capacities of local actors to manage those assets in equitable and conflict-sensitive ways.<sup>xlviii</sup>

In sum, renewed experimentation and debate at the interface of socio-economic development and peacebuilding has generated considerable insight over the past 15 years. The international community has learned about the pitfalls of orthodox approaches to economic liberalization in postwar contexts. At the policy level, more clarity has emerged about the need to balance measures to secure macro-economic stability and growth, with measures to restore social services and lay the foundations for equitable development. Much is also being learned about how to generate more dynamic and inclusive socio-economic development in rural areas, and at the local level beyond large cities – through enabling national legislation and institutional reforms, by building the capacity of smaller municipal governments in areas like transparent taxation and fiscal management, and by nurturing the economic potential of communities. Yet our preliminary research suggest that practice still lags far behind policy learning, and that there remains room for much bolder innovation on the ground. The following propositions capture the essence of our findings so far.

**Proposition 9:** Economic and social policies for peacebuilding continue to attract too little investment and sustained attention. Macro-economic orthodoxy still tends to trump creative public policy for inclusive development. Official development assistance tends to focus on immediate postwar priorities and invest too little in strengthening national and local capacities for conflict-sensitive development over the long term. National governments are failing to deliver enabling policies such as fiscal decentralization and rural development. Community-level projects remain poorly linked to broader strategies. As such economic and social policies/programs in postwar settings still fall short of yielding the outcomes necessary to sustain peace and prevent the recurrence of conflict.

**Proposition 10:** In some societies there are spaces for much more innovative, conflict-sensitive economic and social policies/programs, such as harmonizing macro-economic policies with the goals of sustainable peacebuilding, investing much greater resources in strengthening the capacities of national and local governments, and fostering inclusive rural development. Politically, it is essential to nurture broader coalitions of reformers to advance such policies/programs for the long periods required to consolidate peace.

The sketch of contemporary peacebuilding in Afghanistan shows how these patterns manifest themselves in a particularly complex and challenging setting.

*Peacebuilding, rural development and war in Afghanistan<sup>xlix</sup>*

The international intervention against the Taliban government in October 2001, and the implementation of the Bonn Agreement since, have brought benefits to Afghanistan:

- Complex processes of constitutional reform and democratic consultation led to relatively free presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004-2005.
- Over 3 million refugees have returned, reconstruction has begun in many provinces and there have been important initiatives in the area of women's rights.

The high-priority National Solidarity Program (NSP) was initiated by the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) in 2003, to foster rural development, and to improve relations between the central state and rural communities.

- By September 2005 almost 9,000 of Afghanistan's 20,000 villages had been reached through small NSP projects, in areas such as public health.
- To be eligible for an NSP grant communities must elect a Community Development Council (CDC) and include men as well as women. The experience of local participation has been positive for many communities.
- Though the NSP appears to be popular, the sustainability of NSP projects is questionable. Evidence from five communities suggests that consultation with stakeholders is inadequate, and that the needs of women and the poor remain marginal to major decisions. Moreover many community-level projects lack connections to each other or to other rural development programs.

At the macro level:

- The war between Taliban and Al-Qaida forces and US-led coalition forces continues in the southern and eastern provinces.
- The central state remains weak and unable to deliver basic public goods.
- Rural development, a key to peacebuilding in a country where 70% of the population lives in rural areas, remains incipient – outside the opium economy.

What could be done to change these dynamics?

- The Karzai Government and the international community could renew attempts to harmonize their policies with the goal of sustainable peacebuilding. This could involve channeling greater investment into national institutions, socio-economic development and especially in rural development.
- This could include providing longer-term funding to the NSP to broaden its reach and ensure its sustainability. MRRD, facilitating partners and development councils should strengthen their capacities to apply good practices of participatory development – including finding more effective ways of nurturing participation by women and the poor at the community level.

## Conclusions

The core question we have been grappling with in this paper and in the WKOP project is simple: What kind of peace is possible in the post-9/11 era? The short answer is that the prospects for ending many of the wars currently raging across the world are not bright. The prospects for building sustainable peace seem worse, especially in deeply fraught situations like Afghanistan, Haiti and Israel-Palestine, and even in cases of relative success like Guatemala and Mozambique. In the former there are narrow spaces for nurturing the democratic governance and socio-economic reforms required to build lasting peace. In the latter the spaces for social inclusion and conflict transformation are greater, partly because they benefited from second-generation peace efforts and a more enabling international environment in the 1990s. The possibilities for using these different spaces depend largely on national change agents' ability to forge new coalitions for change, involving local stakeholders and international agencies as long-term allies.

Of course, the question of what kind of peace is possible today requires a longer answer. The outline of that answer can be seen in this paper. Our preliminary research recognizes that there have been enormously positive policy developments over the past 15 years, in peacebuilding and related fields. Important insights are codified in key OECD DAC and UN guidelines – for example on fostering national ownership of reconstruction processes by stakeholders including women, the poor and other historically-marginalized groups; on harmonizing macro-economic and fiscal policies with peacebuilding priorities; on taking a long-term approach to strengthening national institutions and national capacities for ongoing negotiation. More recent policy prescriptions – on shifting to a culture of conflict prevention, nurturing capacities for democratic governance at the local level, sequencing development assistance over the long-term, on taking integrated approaches on the responsibility to protect and on fragile states – are also insightful and important.

Yet research suggests that there are enduring gaps between these ideals and realities on the ground. Analysts of postwar peacebuilding point to a growing list of “deficits”:

- Democratic deficits: the poor accountability of key state institutions such as national governments, security forces and treasuries, and their weak performance in fostering stakeholder participation.
- Economic deficits: the difficulties of parlaying macro-economic stabilization and growth into substantial poverty reduction, particularly in rural areas.
- Gender equity deficits: women's continued marginalization from positions of influence in government, their uneven inclusion in the benefits of economic recovery and their continued vulnerability to social violence.
- Ownership deficits: the enduring preponderance of international actors in peacebuilding processes, particularly those initiated through military action.

For their part analysts of international intervention point to gaps between the principles proposed by the ICISS and recent practice: namely the use of force on very different grounds in Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, and the inadequate responses to situations like the Israel and Palestine or Western Sudan, where the logic of R2P warranted more decisive

international action. Some suggest that the prevention and rebuilding dimensions of the ICISS recommendations have received inadequate political attention, as have the longer-term, socio-economic and international policy reform implications of the state failure/state building agenda. Others go much further, and question the essential motivation, wisdom and legitimacy of Western discourses on state fragility.

The cases previewed in this paper confirm these concerns. They confirm that it is extremely difficult to move from immediate postwar peacebuilding activities such as the demobilization of combatants, to the deeper reforms required to consolidate peace. They confirm this tendency both in the realm of democratic governance and in the realm of socio-economic development. They also highlight important differences between second-generation peace operations in Guatemala and Mozambique, more limited and ultimately failed processes in Israel-Palestine and Haiti during the 1990s, and ambitious though deeply fraught fourth-generation peace operations in Afghanistan and Haiti today.

One of our key conclusions is that despite the shadows cast by post-9/11 trends, there are spaces for nurturing sustainable peace in each context. For example in Mozambique there is a promising alignment of political will for deeper reforms in the central government, pressure for democratic decentralization from the National Association of Municipalities, and engagement by key international agencies like UNDP and the World Bank. National actors can take advantage of this favourable alignment to secure important changes – such as moving beyond the limited gradualist approach to decentralization – that could significantly deepen peacebuilding in the coming years. At the other extreme we have the situation in the Palestinian Territories, where an unfavourable alignment of forces makes it difficult to forge an alternative to the Israeli government’s unilateral approach, or to secure a final status agreement that addresses fundamental issues. Yet even there the WKOP case study identifies options that national actors can pursue – such as following through on the process of democratic municipal and legislative elections, thereby increasing spaces for opposition movements to engage in peaceful politics and laying the foundations for more broadly-based negotiations with Israel in the future.

The case studies also identify policy options that international actors can support, yet the emphasis remains on national agency as the fulcrum for transnational coalitions. This focus reflects the central role of our southern partners in analyzing their societies’ peacebuilding challenges and identifying options for stakeholders. It demonstrates how this approach can help build bridges between the minimalist goal of war termination and the maximalist goal of conflict transformation. The nuances and range of views on these issues also remind us that there is no such thing as “the view from the South”. Indeed this preview of our case studies shows that there is a rich diversity of perspectives in the South, as there is in the North. We expect the encounter between these diverse views to shed new light on options in the real world of post-9/11 politics.

So far this discussion has been mostly about cases in which one can see peacebuilding in progress. Yet the patterns highlighted so far also apply to cases where postwar reconstruction has not begun. The preview of the Sri Lankan case below illustrates the tensions and possibilities of sustainable peacebuilding in a process that is only beginning.

*No war, no peace in Sri Lanka*

Even before the peace talks between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) reached a deadlock in early 2003, several obstacles had emerged that made sustained progress difficult:

- The LTTE leadership had shown little sensitivity to other stakeholders' demands that any devolution of power to the North and East be conditioned on a democratization of LTTE practices.
- The United National Front (UNF) government was unable to respond positively to LTTE proposals for interim arrangements that would have tested a model of regional autonomy within the framework of a unitary state.
- The UNF government's position was weakened by its orthodox market-oriented economic policies, which failed to distribute the peace dividend to the North and East, or to the rural poor in the South.

In April 2004 this led to the election of a coalition government led by the Peoples' Alliance. Since then:

- The PA government has shown that it has even less margin to return to the negotiation table, due to the influence of its Sinhalese nationalist elements.
- Despite mediation efforts by the Norwegian government, the LTTE has felt increasingly sidelined by other international actors due to the global war on terror.
- Notwithstanding the creation of a Civil Society Sub-Committee on Peace and Reconciliation, civil society has remained marginal to the peace talks.

These dynamics, the pressure they have put on the ceasefire agreement and the tragic destruction caused by the Tsunami in December 2004, have made it difficult to keep creative options for transformative peacebuilding on the agenda.

Yet the experiences of other peace processes suggest three major lessons for Sri Lanka:

- There is little chance of building lasting peace until stakeholders agree on bold reforms in the areas of democratic, federal governance and equitable socio-economic development.
- Such reforms will require the support of a broader coalition linking champions of transformation from the local to the national and international levels – probably including key leaders in government, the LTTE and civil society.
- Though the post-9/11 international security environment has made such inclusive coalition-building difficult, a return to war or an acquiescence to external military intervention would make peacebuilding even more difficult.

Sri Lanka's own history, its earlier peace efforts and the experience of the Indian Peace Force, seem to confirm these three insights from comparative analysis.

All the propositions and preliminary conclusions put forth in this paper are being tested more systematically in each case. WKOP researchers are using a common methodology for their studies. They all began with a review the literature on peacebuilding in their society to identify the range of views on whether peacebuilding is addressing (or will address) the structural underpinnings of war, and the factors underlying implementation trends/prospects. This secondary research was complemented by analyses of primary documents, aggregate data such as opinion polls and household socioeconomic surveys, as well as key informant interviews at the national level. Each case study then examined implementation patterns in selected areas of governance and economic reconstruction – such as democratic participation, decentralization, fiscal reform or rural development – both at the national and local levels, weaving gender and wider social analysis into this assessment. Local field research is also drawing on primary documents, key informant interviews and participant observation. All case studies are being revised on the basis of peer reviews and validation meetings will local, national and international stakeholders.

These case studies will be the basis for a more rigorous comparative analysis that seeks to identify important overarching patterns, and salient differences, across the cases and across what we could loosely call the dependent and independent variables. The former includes the long-term peacebuilding outcomes we are examining, as well as sustainable policy options, particularly in the domains of governance and economic development. The latter include the institutions, strategies and politics of transnational coalitions -- with an emphasis on influential national actors. We do not aim to generate statistically-significant generalizations through this process. Rather, we hope to produce context-specific and overarching insights through the method of focused comparison.<sup>ii</sup> Our final conclusions will build on the preliminary propositions advanced in this paper.

By looking at longer-term outcomes, prospects and options, by looking at how these processes are being negotiated between local, national and international actors, and by looking at the transnational coalitions that could emerge around more sustainable strategies – the WKOP team is contributing to informed policy dialogue in the countries where we are active. In the global arena, we are engaging the debates on peacebuilding from a conflict prevention standpoint, on what can be done in failed and failing states, as well as the debate on putting the responsibility to protect into practice. Our interlocutors in each society, and in the global peacebuilding community, will be the judges of whether these contributions are illuminating and useful in practical terms.

### **Endnotes**

---

<sup>i</sup> This sketch is based on the WKOP case study by Shikaki, 2005.

<sup>ii</sup> For a different but compatible categorization of UN peace operations see Woodward, 2002a.

<sup>iii</sup> Paris, 1997 and 2004.

<sup>iv</sup> See for example Hampson, 1996.

<sup>v</sup> Stedman, Rothchild and Cousens, 2002.

<sup>vi</sup> Lederach, 1997: 152. See also Rupesinghe, 1995 and Galtung, 1969.

<sup>vii</sup> Bendaña, 2003; Saldomando, 2002; Uyangoda and Pereira, 2003.

<sup>viii</sup> Strickland and Duvvury, 2003.

<sup>ix</sup> *Ibid.*: 1.

<sup>x</sup> This sketch is based on the WKOP case study by Aguilera, 2005.

- 
- xi Carnegie Commission, 1997.
- xii UN Secretary General, 2001.
- xiii Schnabel and Carment, 2004.
- xiv GPPAC, 2005.
- xv ICISS, 2001: xi.
- xvi Despite this blockage on R2P at the global level, the African Union and sub-regional entities such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have codified commitments on R2P and are currently establishing the machinery to give effect to those norms. See Powell, 2005.
- xvii President of the United States, 2002.
- xviii Uvin, 2002.
- xix OECD DAC/DCD, 2005. See also World Bank, 2002.
- xx Major contributions to that literature include Gross, 1996; Mallaby, 2002; Rotberg, 2003; Ignatieff, 2003; Chesterman, Thakur and Ignatieff, 2005.
- xxi International Crisis Group, 2004.
- xxii See Baranyi 2005a and 2005b for a more detailed analysis of these trends in Canada. See Maas and Mepham, 2004 for German and UK perspectives and US Commission, 2004 for a US perspective. For a Norwegian counterpoint to this trend see Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004.
- xxiii This sketch draws on Harvard Law Students Advocates for Human Rights, 2005.
- xxiv Wood, 2001.
- xxv Reilly et al, 1998.
- xxvi Bush, 2004; Suhrke and Strand, forthcoming.
- xxvii Paris, 1997 and 2005.
- xxviii De Zeeuw, 2004.
- xxix Bush, 2004:24.
- xxx Woodward, 2002b: 22.
- xxxi Manning, 2003.
- xxxii Mayer and Rajasingham-Senayake, 2003: 8.
- xxxiii This sketch is based on the WKOP case study by Siteo and Hunguana, 2005.
- xxxiv Fearon and Laitin, 2002.
- xxxv Daudelin, 2002.
- xxxvi Berdal and Malone, 2000.
- xxxvii Ballentine and Sherman, 2003.
- xxxviii Collier et al, 2003.
- xxxix Suhrke, Villanger and Woodward, 2004.
- xl de Soto and del Castillo, 1995.
- xli Boyce, 2002; Woodward, 2002a.
- xlii Smith, 2003: 10.
- xliii Ibid.: 50.
- xliv Carbonnier, 1998: 64.
- xlv CONGCOOP y CNOC, 2002.
- xlvi Kelegama, 2004.
- xlvii Mayer and Rajasingham, 2003.
- xlviii Thillet, 2003.
- lix This sketch is based on the WKOP case study by Zakhilwal and Thomas, 2005.
- <sup>1</sup> This sketch is based on the WKOP case study by Uyangoda, 2005.
- li Stedman's major comparative study of peace implementation followed the same methodological rationale -- namely to develop theory and practice by highlighting important patterns and causal relationships in several illuminating cases. See Stedman, 2002: 3.

### Selected bibliography

- Aguilera, Gabriel (2005). "Guatemala: Entre la paz posible y la paz deseable." Guatemala: Programa de Participación y Democracia, WKOP working paper.
- Ballentine, Karen and Sherman, Jake, eds. (2003) *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Baranyi, Stephen (2005a). « Quel avenir pour le Canada et la consolidation de la paix? Innovation et efficacité dans une période de turbulences. » Yvan Conoir et Gérard Herna, eds. *Faire la Paix* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université de Laval),
- Baranyi, Stephen (2005b). « Canada and the Peace and Security Pillar of the Millennium Declaration. » *Towards 2015: Meeting our Millennium Commitments* (Ottawa: The North-South Institute).
- Bendaña, Alejandro (2003). "What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Critical Assessments from the South. A Discussion Paper." *What Kind of Peace is Being Built? Working Paper 7*, (Ottawa: IDRC).
- Berdal, Mats and Malone, David M., eds. (2000) *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas and Civil Wars* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers).
- Boyce, James K. (2002) *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars* Adelphi Paper 351 (London: IISS).
- Brazão, Mazula, ed. (2002). *Mozambique: Dez Anos de Paz* (Maputo: CEDE)
- Bush, Kenneth (2004). *Building Capacity for Peace and Unity. The Role of Local Government in Peacebuilding* (Ottawa: Federation of Canadian Municipalities).
- Carbonnier, Gilles (1998). "Conflict, Post-War Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature." Geneva: War-Torn Societies Project, WSP Occasional Paper.
- Carnegie Commission (1997). *Preventing Deadly Conflict. Final Report* (New York: Carnegie Corporation).
- Chesterman, Simon, Ignatieff, Michael and Thakur, Ramesh, eds. (2005) *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo: UN University Press and the International Peace Academy).
- Collier, Paul et al. (2003) *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy* (Washington and Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press).
- CONGCOOP y CNOC (2002). *FONTIERRAS: El modelo de mercado y el acceso a la tierra en Guatemala* (Guatemala: CONGCOOP).

Daudelin, Jean. (2002) "Agrarian Structures, Agrarian Policies and Violence in Central America and Southern Mexico." Unpublished paper for the North-South Institute, available at [www.nsi-ins.ca](http://www.nsi-ins.ca).

Doyle, Michael W. and Sambanis, Nicholas (2000). "International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis." *American Political Science Review* 94.

Fearon, James and David Laitin (2003). "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil Wars." *American Political Science Review*.

Galtung, Johan (1969). "Violence, Peace and Peace Research." *Journal of Peace Research*.6: 3.

GPPAC (2005). *People Building Peace: A Global Action Agenda for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (Utrecht: ECCP)

Gross, Jean-Germain (1996). "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti." *Third World Quarterly* 17:3.

Hampson, Fen Osler (1996). *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail?* (Washington DC: USIP).

Harvard Law Students Advocates for Human Rights and Centro de Justiça Global (2005). *Keeping the Peace in Haiti?* (Cambridge, Harvard University).

International Crisis Group (2004). "Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge," *Middle East Report* 27. Baghdad/Brussels: ICG.

Ignatieff, Michael (2003). *Empire Light: Nation Building in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan* (London: Minerva).

ICISS (2001). *The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.* (Ottawa: IDRC).

Keating, Tom and Knight, Andy, eds. (2004). *Building Sustainable Peace* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press).

Kelegama, Saman (2004). "Economic Dividend of the Post-War Period in Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects." Paper presented at the WIDER Conference on «Making Peace Work », Helsinki, Finland, 4-5 June 2004.

Lederach, John Paul (1997). *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace).

Mallaby, Sebastian (2002). "The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for American Empire." *Foreign Affairs* 81:2.

Manchanda, Rita, ed. (2001). *Women, War and Peace in South Asia, Beyond Victimhood to Agency* (London: Sage Publication).

Maas, Gero and Mepham, David (2004). "Promoting Effective States: A Progressive Policy Response to Failed and Failing States." London: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Institute for Public Policy Research.

Manning, Carrie (2003). "Local Challenges to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding" *International Peacekeeping*. 10:3.

Mayer, Markus, Rajasingham-Senanayake, Darini and Thangarajah, Yuvi, eds. (2003) *Building Local Capacities for Peace: Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka* (Delhi: Macmillan India Ltd).

Moore, David (2000). "Levelling the Playing Fields and Embedding Illusions: 'Post-Conflict' Discourse and Neo-liberal 'Development' in War-torn Africa" *Review of African Political Economy* 27: 83.

Nathan, Laurie. (2001) "The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: The Structural Causes of Crisis and Violence in Africa." *Track Two* 10:2.

Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004). *Strategic Framework. Peacebuilding – a Development Perspective*. (Oslo: Utenriksdepartementet).

OECD (2001). *The DAC Guidelines: Helping Prevent Violent Conflict*. (Paris: OECD).

OECD DAC/DCD (2005). "Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States." Draft Note by the Secretariat. Paris: OECD DAC/DCD.

Paris, Roland (1997). "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism" *International Security* 22: 2.

Paris, Roland (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Powell, Kristiana (2005). "The African Union's Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on *The Responsibility to Protect*." Ottawa: North-South Institute Working Paper.

President of the United States (2002). *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: President of the United States).

Reilly, Benjamin, Harris, Peter and Lund, Michael (1998). *Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict* (Sweden: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance).

- Rotberg, Robert (2003). "The New Nature of Nation-State Failure." *The Washington Quarterly* 25:3.
- Rupesinghe, Kumar (1995). *Conflict Transformation* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan).
- Saldomando, Angel (2002). "Diagnóstico de la paz en América Central." Working Paper 6 (Ottawa: IDRC).
- Schnabel, Albrecht and Carment, David, eds. (2004). *Conflict Prevention. From Rhetoric to Reality* (Toronto: Lexington Books).
- Shikaki, Khalil (2005). "What Kind of Peace is Possible? The Case of Palestine: 1993-2005." Ramallah: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, WKOP paper.
- Sitoe, Eduardo and Hunguana, Carolina (2005). "Democratic Decentralization is Needed to Keep the Mozambican Miracle Alive." Maputo: Centro de Estudios de Democracia y Desarrollo, WKOP paper.
- Smith, Dan (2003). "Getting their Act Together. Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding. Overview of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding." Oslo: PRIO.
- de Soto, Alvaro and Graciana del Castillo (1995). "Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements: Staying the Course in El Salvador" *Global Governance* 1: 2.
- Stedman, Stephen J., Rothchild, Donald and Elizabeth M. Cousens, eds. (2002) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements* (London: Lynne Rienner).
- Strickland, Richard and Nata Duvvury (2003). "Gender Equity and Peacebuilding: From Rhetoric to Reality: Finding the Way. A Discussion Paper" (Washington, D.C.: International Center for Research on Women).
- Suhrke, Astri and Arne Strand, "The Logic of Conflictual Peacebuilding" in Barakat, Sultan (ed) *Reconstruction after War* (London: I.B. Taurus, forthcoming).
- Suhrke, Astri, Espen Vilanger and Susan Woodward (2004). «Economic Aid to Post-Conflict countries : Correcting the Empirical and Theoretical Foundations of Policy. » Paper presented at the WIDER Conference on «Making Peace Work », Helsinki, Finland, 4-5 June 2004.
- Tandon, Yash (1999). *Globalization and Africa's Options* (Harare: International South Group Network).
- Thillet, Braulia et al. (2003) *Tierras municipales en Guatemala : Un desafío para el desarrollo local sostenible*. (Guatemala: FLACSO).

- Tschirgi, Neclâ (2004). "Post-conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, Challenges." (New York: International Peace Academy).
- United Nations (2002). Women Peace and Security. Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000). (New York: UN).
- United Nations Secretary-General (2001). Prevention of Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General. Fifty-fifth session.
- United States Commission on Weak States and National Security (2004). On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security (Washington: Center for Global Development).
- Uvin, Peter (2002). "The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms." *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1:1.
- Uyangoda, Jayadeva (2005) "Transition from Civil War to Peace: Challenges of Peacebuilding in Sri Lanka." Colombo: Social Scientists' Association, WKOP paper.
- Uyangoda, Jayadeva and Morina Perera (2003). Sri Lanka's Peace Process 2002: Critical Perspectives (Colombo: Social Scientists' Association).
- Wood, Elizabeth Jean (2001). Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transition in South Africa and El Salvador (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Woodward, Susan L. (2002a) "Economic Priorities for Peace Implementation" International Peace Academy Series on Peace Implementation" (New York: IPA).
- Woodward, Susan L. (2002b) "Local Governance Approach to Social Reintegration and Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict Countries." Discussion paper for the IPA/UNDP workshop, New York, 8 October 2002.
- World Bank (2002). Work in Low Income Countries Under Stress: A Taskforce Report (Washington: World Bank Group).
- Zakhilwal, Omar and Thomas, Jane (2005). "Afghanistan: What Kind of Peace? The role of Rural Development in Peacebuilding." Kabul: Afghanistan Center for Policy and Development Studies, WKOP working paper.
- De Zeeuw, Jeroen (2004). "Projects Do Not Create Institutions: The Record of Democracy Assistance to Post-Conflict Societies." Paper presented at the 45<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention of the ISA, Montreal, Canada, 17-20 March 2004.