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Middle Power Clout: Sweden And The Development Banks
by Jan Rudengren with Peter Gisle and Karin Brann
Sweden has often been of two minds about joining and
supporting the multilateral development banks (MDBs).
The desire to support development has been countered
by a hesitation to contribute to governments seen to
conduct policies at variance with Swedish ideals or
objectives.
In the final analysis, Sweden did decide to join the
MDBs and was a founding member of the Asian Development
Bank (AsDB) in 1966, although it subscribed the minimum
of capital. It did not join the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) until 1976. Its greatest interest has been
in the African Development Bank (ADB), joining its Fund
in 1972. This was natural since Swedish bilateral aid
has been concentrated on Africa, and the Bank was seen
as a "home-grown" African institution. At
December 1992, its subscribed capital to the multilateral
development banks amounted to US$2.2 billion (more than
80 percent to the World Bank) and $161 million had been
paid in, including $45 million to the African Bank.
The clout Sweden wields by itself in the regional banks
is not large. In the African Bank, it holds a seat as
an Executive Director (with the other Nordic countries
and Switzerland) for three years in 15, while in the
Asian Bank it is Alternate Executive Director for two
years in every 12. Canada holds the AsDB Executive Director
post in Sweden's constituency or voting group, which
includes Canada and the Netherlands in addition to the
Nordic countries. Rudengren writes that this constituency
"has often been at the forefront on issues that
are central to Swedish development policy, such as poverty
alleviation, the environment, and women in development."
However, he thinks Sweden has not fully used its potential
influence in the Banks, mostly because it does not have
staff in strategic posts.
Sweden seeks alliances to increase its clout, and preliminary
meetings among the Nordic countries produce joint policies.
Lack of documentation of such meetings makes it difficult
to identify separate Swedish influence, however.
One of Sweden's main motives in joining the regional
banks has been to gain access to the procurement opportunities
of their development projects. It has done well in supplying
goods in IDB and AsDB projects, and in procuring consulting
contracts with the IDB.
In general, Rudengren approves of the regional banks,
worrying a little about overlap with the World Bank.
The issue, he states, is not really whether Sweden should
continue to be a member of the Banks, but rather at
what level of engagement. He argues that the answer
is political. And if Sweden wants to remain an active
member, how can it best influence the Banks' operations
and policies? The key, he feels, is in strengthening
Swedish representation at the Banks' Boards of Directors.
This, however, would imply a considerable increase in
Sweden's shareholding, which is not realistic for either
Sweden or the Banks.
About The Book And Author
Published in 1995, this study is part of a larger project
on the multilateral banks, launched by the North- South
Institute in 1991 and supported by the Canadian International
Development Agency, the Ford Foundation, the Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs, the Netherlands Ministry for Development
Cooperation, the Inter-American Development Bank, the
Caribbean Development Bank, the African Development
Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. This volume was
undertaken at the initiative of the Swedish Ministry
for Foreign Affairs.
Jan Rudengen is a member of the Scandinavian
Project Managers of Stockholm.
Available at a cost of $12 from: Renouf
Publishing Co.
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