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Vol.2, No.1 (1998)

The Landmine Ban: Globalization of Civil Society?

By Maxwell A. Cameron

The movement to ban anti-personnel (AP) mines is a tale of David triumphing over Goliath. A coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), united under the umbrella of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), and working in concert with a group of like-minded small and middle powers, was able to negotiate, in just 14 months, a comprehensive ban on the use, production, export, and stockpiling of AP mines. At the signing ceremony in Ottawa in December, the partnership between global civil society and like-minded states was heralded as a new superpower. Hyperbole aside, does the ban on land-mines portend a shift or transformation in the post-Cold War global system?

Civil society refers to the networks of formal and informal institutions through which groups and organizations in society interact, and it becomes global when these networks cross nation-state boundaries. The ICBL, an umbrella group composed of more than 1,000 NGOs from some 60 countries, is a good example of an organization that transcends national boundaries. It is a loosely organized and unstructured network of groups and individuals -- with only a handful of key full-time and paid activists -- that draws upon the resources, both financial and human, of a broad spectrum of member organizations interconnected by fax machines, the internet, and periodic conferences. By bringing the plight of the most vulnerable victims of war to the attention of the media and public opinion around the world, the ICBL set the agenda for the ban movement.

The ICBL went beyond calling attention to the mines issue; it participated actively in the negotiation of the Ottawa convention. In what has come to be known as the Ottawa Process, three innovations came together: a partnership between states and NGOs, allowing "two-track diplomacy" in which both states and NGOs participated in the development of the convention; small- and medium-sized states working together in a coalition of the like-minded; and negotiating outside normal channels and mechanisms in order to place AP mines on a diplomatic fast track to extinction.

In many ways, the ban movement was unique. It was easy to present the issue to the public in terms of a simple moral and political choice: to keep a weapon based on limited military utility or ban it on the grounds of massive and indiscriminate humanitarian costs. Ban advocates were fortunate to have the support of prominent individuals like Princess Diana and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and last minute changes of government in France and England brought momentum to the movement. Moreover, courageous leadership was critical: the ban would not have been achieved -- at least not with such spectacular speed -- had Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy been unwilling to go out on a diplomatic limb and set a 14-month deadline for signing a convention.

There are three basic lessons to be learned from the Ottawa Process. First, partnership delivers. Governments working together with global civil society can achieve diplomatic results far beyond what might have been possible in the Cold War era. But partnership requires that both governments and NGOs overcome their mutual ambivalence about working together. Second, small- and medium-sized states, in partnership with global civil society, can overcome big power opposition; the US does not always have to lead in the new post-Cold War environment. Finally, traditional diplomatic forums and mechanisms can and should be subverted where they represent an obstacle to the achievement of policy goals that are widely demanded by world opinion. Multilateralism is fine as long as states are prepared to move as fast as the slowest in the pack, but coalitions of the like-minded are preferable when the public wants results.

The emergence of global civil society holds the promise of making existing international institutions more democratic, transforming them through innovation and experimentation, and anchoring them in world opinion. The era of nation-states is, of course, far from over but the fact that an entire category of weaponry, widely used by armies around the world, has been banned from the arsenals of 121 states following negotiations of astounding rapidity suggests that world politics have been transformed since the Cold War in ways that we are only beginning to understand. The Ottawa Process provides reason to believe that global civil society is a basic ingredient of this transformation.

 

Maxwell Cameron is a professor at Carleton University's Norman Paterson School of International Affairs.

 

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