Summary. The following note has been compiled by the North-South Institute on behalf of the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group (SIARG) to inform a consultation requested by the Government of Canada’s Sudan Task Force on the future of Canada’s engagement in Sudan. This short think piece provides a sampling of SIARG membership views on Canadian engagement and generates some forward-looking ideas for development, security, and diplomatic initiatives. It does not reflect a common position or consensus among SIARG members, but instead aims to offer a starting point for discussion. It is focussed on some of the directions the government of Canada could take in the coming years, but this focus does not mean to understate or obscure the important contributions that have been made and will continue to be made by Canadian civil society working in Sudan and with Sudanese partners.

The Government Canada has spent approximately $761.6M in Sudan since fiscal year 2004-2005, when it began engaging substantively in the international action on Darfur. What has been the impact of that investment in reducing poverty, protecting vulnerable populations, working towards better security, stability and a political settlement? It is not the remit of this think piece to attempt a systematic evaluation of the Canadian government’s engagement in Sudan. It will, however, raise some questions about what has worked, what has worked less well, and what might be appropriate for continued Government of Canada support for lasting peace and stability in Sudan.

1. Introduction. Canada’s engagement in Sudan is driven principally by a humanitarian responsibility to assist vulnerable, conflict-affected populations, as well to promote poverty reduction; to help reduce the threat to regional and international security posed by the instability and conflicts in Sudan; and, finally, to identify an effective Canadian role alongside influential G8 partners.

Four inter-related issues are relevant to peace and stability in Sudan. One key challenge facing Sudan is the 2011 referendum in Southern Sudan, part of the broader implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The process leading to that exercise in self-determination, including the 2010 election, will help settle whether Sudan remains a single sovereign territory, carries out a velvet divorce, descends into renewed violence, or some combination of thereof. However, for democratic

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1 The views developed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily of The North-South Institute.
2 These numbers are approximate tabulations of Canadian spending across Sudan; however, numbers may vary depending on the agency that has compiled the account, and when their data was most recently updated. This approximation was provided by CIDA. The bulk of this spending was focused on material and logistical support to UN and AU missions in Sudan, as well as to humanitarian aid.
governments such as Canada, galvanized by engaged and critical publics, the central challenge is to protect civilians in Darfur and work towards a durable political settlement. The dissonance between these two sets of priorities has been one reason why the Contact Group of key Western democracies, including Canada, has been relatively late in effectively grasping the nettle of the CPA, which remains an important factor in the stability in Sudan.

A second challenge concerns principles and mechanisms to ensure secure and stable relationships across borders and regions. These principles should be relevant to a peaceful and productive relationship across the North-South Sudan border whether or not it becomes an international border following the referendum. A third challenge concerns the security dimensions of the CPA, including the DDR process and the integration and modernization of armed forces. Finally, most stakeholders recognize that the Darfur crisis and the North-South conflict are inter-connected and that a failure to address one conflict could undermine progress on the other.

The current review of Canada’s engagement in Sudan coincides with a shift in the tone and content of international diplomacy. Following a period of apparent drift and ineffectiveness in international engagement on Sudan, and the mixed impact of the ICC indictment of President al Bashir, a new US administration provides an opportunity for renewed progress on Darfur and the CPA. The Americans are in the process of developing a new strategy in Sudan, which is set to be announced in the “coming weeks”; there is some indication that US Special Envoy, Scott Gration, is tilting toward a policy of constructive engagement. With renewed US leadership, key policy makers in the Contact Group also appear to be at a point of consensus on Sudan. The elements of that consensus appear to include:

- Achieving an inclusive negotiated political settlement in Darfur;
- Preserving North-South peace by full implementation of the CPA;
- Supporting capable, democratic governance and the diffusion of power; and
- Engaging Khartoum on counter-terrorism and regional security.

As well, The Hague Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) decision on Abyei, the US-led trilateral talks with the NCP and SPLM, and the recent Forum for Supporters of the CPA held in Washington all point to a more enabling environment for progress in implementing the CPA and resolving some of the most contentious issues, notably the North-South border and the question of oil revenues.

2. The Current Situation in Sudan.

2a. Darfur is the most visible humanitarian issue of our time, and the political issues underpinning the crisis are still unresolved. Notwithstanding AU/UN mediation and regional diplomacy by the Arab League, AU elders and others, a negotiated settlement remains elusive as the conflict has mutated from war and the most brutal forms of ethnic

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cleansing and human rights abuses to a low intensity conflict, a splintering of rebel movements, localized banditry, and inter-rebel and intra-Arab tribal conflicts over land and other assets. IDP camps have become militarized and less secure over time. OCHA reports nearly 2.7 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Darfur, as well as a sizeable refugee population in Chad. An additional two million residents continue to be directly affected by the conflict. At a cost of about US$1 billion per year, 4.2M Darfurians are in need of food aid and other emergency support. Targeted violence against humanitarian workers and their assets continues, further constraining humanitarian access.

As one SIARG member put it: “Darfur is now a stand alone issue” that has defied real progress. Policy makers and the Canadian public must weigh how long Canada’s humanitarian support can or should be sustained. What are the global costs in terms of missed opportunities to serve other vulnerable populations? Absent a political settlement, is Canada prepared to continue this massive assistance to Darfur indefinitely?

2b. Southern Sudan is poised at a critical juncture. With a potentially decisive general election in 2010 and a referendum on Southern independence from the North looming in 2011, the region remains fragile. While overall stability has held, there are sporadic but serious outbreaks of violence and large numbers of illegal small arms and light weapons. If anything the tempo of localized, resource-based communal and inter-tribal conflicts has accelerated in the last several years. While the PCA decision on Abyei and the US-led trilateral talks have helped to renew a climate of improved confidence between North and South Sudan, key elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), such as the census, the land commission and the question of oil revenues remain disputed or not implemented, corroding the North-South partnership in the interim government and undermining the prospects for unity. Violent attacks on civilians (especially by other civilians) in the South are commonplace, and casualty counts have come to exceed those in Darfur over the past year. The reconstruction challenge in the South is immense but there is a profound capacity gap at all but the most senior levels of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). While the GoSS is establishing a framework for governance, it is dominated by military officials whose organizational culture is control rather than accountability. Civil society, the media, political parties and social capital have been considerably weakened by long years of war and social dislocation. These institutions today have little ability to check, balance and confront the corruption, patronage and identity politics that distort democratic governance in Southern Sudan. International aid partners, including Canada, thus face the long-term challenge of helping support the fledgling institutions and human capital that are the bedrock for sustainable development in Southern Sudan.

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4 Communication by Tag Elkhazin
5 It is worth noting, however, that this ruling has led to discontent among the Misseriya population along the border in Abyei.
Unfortunately, the CPA vision to “make unity attractive” remains elusive given the relatively slow delivery of services and jobs that are the basis of a tangible peace dividend, and in the absence of a demobilized, reintegrated and modernized army or an effective police force to assure public order. International partners, such as Canada, have a considerable stake in better understanding the dynamics and potential flash points for renewed conflict, and in ensuring that their interventions not only ‘do no harm,’ but also provide the building blocks for stability and a durable peace. The proposed conflict assessment to be undertaken by DFAIT is a very welcome signal of a Canadian commitment to enhanced knowledge which could serve as a basis for potential conflict prevention programming.

2c. Regional Dimensions: The weakness of regional security arrangements (including IGAD) and a profound security dilemma facing weak states with porous borders and irredentist movements is a key driver for the persistence of conflict in the Horn of Africa. One major node of conflict surrounds interlocking rebellions in Sudan, which are intimately connected with issues in Chad, Uganda and the Central African Republic. Chad and Sudan, in spite of a series of agreements, continue to support insurgent groups across their shared border. Further, insecurity in the South is partly linked to the conflict in Northern Uganda; the Lord’s Resistance Army regularly terrorizes the population in the Equatorial Provinces of Southern Sudan, exacerbating challenges with civilian disarmament as well as leading to the displacement of civilian populations. A second major cluster of regional conflict links the festering dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the power struggle in Somalia, which involves the fledgling secular government, anti-government clan militias, Islamist militants, and anti-Islamist warlords. A forward looking conflict prevention strategy beyond 2011 must be a priority in the region. Relatedly, the role of neighbouring states and stakeholders and potential spoilers of peace agreements need to be clearly indentified in conflict mitigation strategies.

3. Retrospective on Canada’s Engagement and Achievements

Canada has had a difficult bilateral relationship with the Bashir regime, which took power in Khartoum in 1989. To protest human rights abuses, Canada initially downgraded bilateral relations and confined aid spending to humanitarian assistance and support for peace talks to end the North-South conflict. Additionally, Canada neither promotes commercial activity in Sudan, nor allows the sale of military assets to Khartoum. There are contentious outstanding issues between the two governments. For instance, Canada is a strong supporter of the International Criminal Court, and has donated Cdn$500,000 to support the Court in its investigations in Sudan. The court has outstanding warrants for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, militia-leader Ali Kushayb and government minister Ahmed Haroun. The warrant against al-Bashir in particular has led to controversy over the potential tradeoffs between international justice and a peace process in Darfur, as well as over a potential deferral of the warrant under

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7 The emerging border conflict along the Kenya-Sudan border between the Turkana and the Toposa has only exacerbated these sources of insecurity.
Article 16 of the Rome Statute. Critics argue that the warrant will disrupt an already fragile peace process, and encourage rebel groups to harden their positions, reducing the potential for compromise and a political settlement. Supporters of the Court counter that the warrants would push the Sudanese government towards compromise, marginalize al-Bashir, and serve as a catalyst for peace. In the short term, Khartoum’s reaction to the warrants led to the expulsion of 13 international NGOs providing humanitarian assistance on the ground, which affected humanitarian access and the distribution of aid in Darfur, but has not markedly affected development efforts in other parts of Sudan. An additional complication is that Canadian resource companies—including Talisman—that have been forced by public pressure to divest from Sudan after complaints that their activities have supported human rights violations have left behind a difficult legacy for engagement.

With the glare of public attention on the displacement of civilian populations in Darfur from 2003 onwards, and following personal representation by then UNSG Kofi Annan and then US President George Bush, former Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin was under pressure to “do something” about Darfur. One of the Government of Canada’s most notable achievements was the contribution of armoured personnel carriers, helicopters, and fixed wing support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). This hardware support was complemented by the deployment of up to 17 personnel to train and build the capacity of AU mission staff. Canadian engagement with AMIS faced difficulties in balancing mission requirements with the need to build the AU’s capacity to plan and execute such large missions; attempting to build capacity and run an effective mission at the same time has meant that neither goal has been met as fully as one might hope. At the same time, Canadian APCs and air support were absolutely crucial to the ability of AMIS to navigate the difficult terrain of Darfur. Canada’s essential support to AMIS also enabled it to take a position of leadership within the international community; Canada’s diplomacy was focused through the appointment of a high level panel consisting of Ambassador Robert Fowler, and two senators, Mobina Jaffer and Romeo Dallaire. The DFAIT Taskforce created to support the panel has now become the fulcrum for whole-of-government coordination on Sudan.

As in Darfur, Canadian engagement in security in Southern Sudan has largely occurred under the auspices of international peacekeeping missions. Support to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) included the deployment of up to 30 Canadian Forces personnel, with 20 serving as military observers; these military observers have helped to facilitate the recently launched DDR process in Southern Sudan. Canada has been less engaged in security outside of these multilateral peacekeeping operations. However, DFAIT’s Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force has helped to promote community

11 The Harker Report (2000) commissioned by the Government of Canada found that oil development in Sudan in which a Canadian company was involved contributed to grave violation of international human rights. Currently, there are concerns about the activities of Power Corp which has links with Totalfina, a French oil company active in Sudan.
security in the South by supporting an increase in the numbers of female police officers, as well as providing police training programs; it has also supported the UNDP in its work with the region’s prison service and judiciary. Still, the United Kingdom, the United States, Switzerland, and Norway remain the major players in justice and security programming in Southern Sudan.

After the Harper government took office in 2006, Canada maintained and even extended some of its commitments in Sudan, which is its largest investment in a fragile state in Africa. The most notable achievement has been to rapidly increase the aid program, with commitments of up to Cdn$100M per year in FY 2008-09 and FY 2009-10, which was then expected to level off to about Cdn$63M per year to FY 2012-13. On the other hand, hardware support to peacekeeping in Darfur is coming to an end: both the APCs and air support have been drawn down and removed over the course of the transition to UNAMID. While still part of the Contact Group, in the absence of a high profile envoy or a clear domestic champion, Canada is neither prominent as a peace entrepreneur nor notably as active on the diplomatic track. Moreover, for laudable reasons of efficiency and harmonization, most of Canada’s aid dollars are delivered through multilateral channels, whether through the UN World Food Program in the case of humanitarian assistance or through the World Bank managed Multi Donor Trust Funds. Although these mechanisms have improved donor coordination, they have been weaker at ensuring quick dispersal of funds in order to foster a tangible peace dividend. By contrast, Canada’s small bilateral aid program has limited scope to really engage Sudanese civil society or carve out a distinctive programming niche. Like most of the international community, Canadian engagement has been largely state-centric, leaving a missed opportunity to build legitimacy and a strong state-society relationship through a vibrant national civil society. Finally, questions remain about the level of resource allocation for Canada’s engagement in Sudan in the coming years.

4. Opportunities for Canadian Policy Moving Forward

4a. Is it worth engaging in Sudan in the coming years? Sudan is at the centre of a particularly large and difficult node of violent conflict in the Horn of Africa. Outcomes in Sudan are intimately linked with the security situation in the rest of the region, especially in Chad and Central African Republic, but also in the Horn of Africa. Sudan also remains one of the most impoverished countries in the world. Although it’s per capita GDP is commensurate with middle income status, grave regional inequality means that poverty is a serious concern in much of the country. Sudan ranks 149 out of 177 countries in the UNDP human development index, and is ranked third in the 2009 Foreign Policy failed states index, falling behind only Somalia and Zimbabwe.

An assessment of the donor application in South Sudan of DAC Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations concluded that: donor coordination has been quite advanced, with a number of innovative mechanisms tried out. Furthermore, there has been a concerted effort towards contributing to the building of the South Sudan state. This effort, however, has focused on building institutions from the top down in Juba, without a complementary emphasis on building legitimacy and the relations between state apparatus and society. See “International Engagement in Sudan after the CPA”, Anita Haslik and Axel Borchgrevink, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007.
reflects serious weaknesses in governance and the regional allocation of resources, in the provision of state services, as well as in infrastructure. It also reflects the legacy of conflicts that have affected the country since its independence in 1956.

The next few years in Sudan will be decisive as elements of the CPA, including elections and the referendum on national unity, play out. With elections scheduled for 2010, disputed census results, and the contentious referendum in 2011, sustained diplomatic attention could make a significant difference in the prospects for sustained and sustainable peace. Many experts argue that implementation of the CPA will be crucial to improving the quality of life of millions of people in the territory, and preventing the return of wide scale civil war. Thus, the period from 2009 to 2013 is a critical juncture where a large and sustained aid, security, and diplomatic investment can give Sudanese the most enabling conditions “to move permanently off the violent conflict escalator”. If that is not achieved and Sudan returns to full-scale war, it may be another generation before such an opportunity resurfaces.\(^\text{13}\) There is space for Canada to make a contribution during this window.

However, Canadian ODA and engagement modalities have fluctuated in recent years. One SIARG member noted that “shifting political momentum, interest, [and] choices in line with political leadership jeopardize the longer term vision and stability required to make a dent in building stability, capacity and peace”.\(^\text{14}\)

On the diplomatic front, notwithstanding the US Special Envoy’s remarks on the “remnants of genocide” in Darfur and the apparent tilt in US policy towards constructive engagement with Sudan, it is not clear that Canada can or should shift the tone and content of its bilateral diplomacy. The fact is that the Government of Canada has had a difficult development and diplomatic relationship with Khartoum with long standing concerns about human rights abuses, the humanitarian crisis and violence in Darfur, and the weak implementation of the CPA. While Canada’s significant aid footprint could be a calling card for discussions on other fronts, Canada’s support for the ICC process in Sudan, Canadian public attention on Darfur, and concerns about Canadian oil company activities make it unlikely that Ottawa could easily engage Khartoum on the more contentious aspects of the bilateral relationship. Given these complexities, the Canadian government may be better placed to work through multi-lateral forums or through bilateral relationships with governments who in turn may have influence over Sudan. Indeed, some SIARG members want to see Canada maintain an ethical foreign policy anchored in a continued call for Sudanese compliance with the ICC indictment process, while avoiding any conflict of interest with Canadian commercial interests in the oil sector. They argue that Canada should work through the UN Security Council and other regional and ad hoc forums to “raise the volume of its moral voice in the international arena” in order to ensure that Khartoum's role in Darfur as well as its support to criminal elements (such as the LRA) and renegade militias in South Sudan are not allowed to be ignored.

\(^{13}\) Communication by John Siebert of Project Ploughshares.
\(^{14}\) Communication by Lucie Goulet, Oxfam.
The ICC will remain a difficult diplomatic issue in the years to come. While Canada, as a long-standing advocate of the ICC on the world stage, should continue supporting the court’s work, there is also space for Canada to support more nationally and locally rooted justice mechanisms. For instance, restorative justice mechanisms to help the Arab tribes of Darfur to coexist peacefully with their Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit neighbours will be crucial to sustained peace in the region. Similarly, support could be targeted at helping the Missereiya and the Ngok Dinka in the Abyei region begin to build more positive relations. Canada’s support for such processes could be critical to reinforcing the idea that justice and peace are not opposing or competing concepts.

A note on unity: At this critical juncture in Sudan’s history, Canada should not take a position on unity and the outcome of the upcoming referendum. This is a decision that belongs solely to the people of Sudan. It can, however, work with international partners to support a capable and responsive public sector in Southern Sudan, and it should add its voice to calls for a fair process and informed choice on elections and the referendum. Indeed, it is worth noting that Canada has significant relevant experience in some of the issues that will be confronting Sudan over the next few years. With two peaceful referenda on secession and one on relatively radical constitutional reform in the past generation, as well as a decentralized federal system, Canada has certainly accrued lessons learned that might—if modestly offered—be useful to the Sudanese. This would require political will, patience, and openness to responsive engagement. Indeed, Canada’s diplomatic contribution could be significant if there is a political champion in Ottawa and it continues to invest in the field presence and intelligence to make inroads into the complex and shifting structures of power and influence in Khartoum or Juba. However, it is just as conceivable that without a sustained high level political commitment to Sudan, Canada may run the risk of being, as one SIARG member put, a “dabbler with other mid-level countries”.

4b. Options for Engagement: Aid and Security. In April 2009, the Minister for International Co-operation announced three new thematic priorities for Canadian development co-operation: food security, youth/children, and economic growth. These priorities could be applicable to Sudan, if CIDA wishes to develop a capacity in these areas. However, even if CIDA is looking for opportunities to build its reputation in these three areas over the medium term, it is important to approach future programming strategically, taking local and national level priorities as the point of departure, and working in collaboration with other donors to ensure that those priorities are met in a coherent and coordinated fashion. Experience suggests that development initiatives work best when conceived, designed, and led locally. In developing priorities for future engagement, it would be advantageous to start with a detailed analysis of the situation in Sudan, as well as the scope of programming already on the ground, and then to develop programs that are in line with both the priorities established nationally to address these gaps, as well as with Canada’s strategic whole-of-government approach to addressing conflict-affected states.

That said, there are opportunities for the new priorities to make a contribution in Sudan. An area development approach in one or more states in the South may be a credible entry
point to integrate the new thematic priorities. It will be necessary to coordinate this assistance, however, to avoid repeating patterns of uneven development at the regional level.

Children and Youth. The priority on children and youth may indeed be useful in Sudan. Ambassador McNee's comments at the Security Council debate on children in armed conflict on 29 April 2009 (S/PV.6114), which recognized Sudan as a tragic illustration of the phenomenon of child soldiers and children in armed conflict, were a useful contribution to this issue area. Canada's recommendation, through the Ambassador, for the Security Council Children in Armed Conflict (CAC) Working Group to visit the field for concrete exposure to better inform its work could provide useful exposure, and there may be a role for Canada to support this visit. Canada and the CAC Working Group should help to address grave violations against children in Sudan, including the continued killing, maiming and abduction of children; rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated against children; and the serious lack of funding for the demobilization of child soldiers. Canada should similarly continue to support humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected children and their families as a core part of its mandate. Furthermore, as called for by Security Council resolution 1882 for children in armed conflict, which Canada strongly supported, Canada should work to "to ensure that the protection, rights, well-being and empowerment of children affected by armed conflict are integrated into all peace processes and that post-conflict recovery and reconstruction planning, programmes and strategies prioritize issues concerning children affected by armed conflict."\(^{15}\)

Economic Growth. Research shows that economic policy is much more important in post-conflict situations like Southern Sudan than in other settings, as the chances of an economic leap are much higher. Starting from a similarly very low base, Mozambique has shown how good policies and improving institutions provide a solid base for sustained growth. But it is vital, in the case of Sudan; to underscore that economic recovery must go beyond a narrow approach to growth. A growth first approach runs the risk of favoring elites and raising new grievances among the poor and marginalized that could reignite conflict. It would be advantageous for the Government of Canada to adopt a much broader perspective that sees economic recovery as achieving socio-economic well-being. This approach includes food security, health, shelter, and educational systems as part and parcel of an economic aid strategy that supports the reconstruction of infrastructure and employment, with a legal framework that supports property rights, holds public spending accountable, and enables banking systems to operate in open markets.

Food Security. Rural development and agriculture are related issues where the new CIDA priorities of economic growth and food security intersect. Food security is also an important issue for early recovery in Darfur which must be planned for if any negotiated settlement is to hold.

Sudan remains a largely rural society. While parts of the country have enormous agricultural potential, large parts of Southern Sudan and Darfur comprise subsistence

\(^{15}\) S/RES/1882 (2009), pp. 4-5
farming and pastoralist activities, requiring alternative livelihoods and careful management of natural resources and land claims. Canada still has an excellent reputation among Sudanese for the agricultural projects supported by CIDA in Gedaref during the 1980s. Both from the perspective of large-scale commercial agriculture and small holder farming, Canadian experts have know-how to share with Sudanese counterparts ranging from agricultural training in the universities and agricultural extension services, to mechanized farming approaches for cash crops. There may also be lessons to be drawn from donor approaches to food security in neighbouring Ethiopia.

There is potential for Sudan to become the bread basket for the Horn of Africa. Yet the UN Environment Program has also warned that a demographic surge and climate change bring the potential for environmental disaster in parts of Sudan. As desertification in Darfur has underscored, without timely action, population pressures leading to local conflicts over scarce resources, may infect larger struggles and contribute to long-term instability in Sudan and neighboring countries. As pressure on the land increases, systems of agriculture, which operated efficiently when land was more plentiful, begin to break down. The land becomes degraded through nutrient depletion, over cropping and overgrazing, and fallow periods become increasingly short.

Support of agro forestry in parts of Africa has been one approach to manage resources and indirectly help mitigate local natural resource conflicts. Using simple techniques, small holders can increase their productivity, build up soil fertility, and reduce soil erosion and deforestation. Preliminary research indicates that for every hectare put into agro forestry alternatives, five to ten hectares can be saved.

Development planning is made more difficult because there is limited knowledge on Sudanese political economy, particularly in Southern Sudan. As a baseline for new programming initiatives, CIDA or IDRC could commission expert studies by Canadian and Sudanese researchers on youth livelihoods, food security and rural agriculture/markets, and regional economic integration.

**Good Governance.** Continued engagement in issues around governance will be vital, because democratization, the diffusion of power, a capable public sector, and a vibrant private sector and civil society are the building blocks for durable economic growth, as well as for ensuring the legitimacy of processes around the 2010 election and 2011 referendum. Effective accountability for public finances is the basis for sound economic policies and the best defence Sudan has that its politics will not degenerate into patronage. Even if no longer a CIDA programming priority, *good governance is still a key cross-cutting issue.* As one SIARG member has underlined: “if war is politics by other means, then war must be replaced by effective politics to be avoided”. To get there, Khartoum must be “challenged and prodded through diplomacy” towards more responsive and legitimate governance. South Sudan requires extensive assistance in establishing democratic institutions and training civilian personnel to plan and deliver services.
In addition to encouraging Canadian Government support for the pivotal 2010 elections and the 2011 referendum, CIDA and START could develop a business model for targeted and long investment in building the institutions of civil society and legislative institutions in Sudan. This could range from helping women’s organizations, lawyers and human rights groups, to enhancing the management of service delivery organizations and policy research institutions. The support given to Sudanese partners by Oxfam Canada, The North-South Institute, and the Canadian Hunger Foundation are good illustrations of what can be achieved.

Security: Although the hardware support to AMIS was crucially important to the mission’s operation in Darfur, the drawdown in military assets leaves space for re-imaging that engagement moving forward. In fairness, Canadian efforts to extend its lift support to UNAMID have bumped up against UN procurement systems that constrain the use of private sector contractors and suppliers (Skylink). Canada has also worked assiduously towards unblocking the logjams delaying UNAMID acquisition of its needed lift, and the mandated troop and policing levels. That said, it is not fully clear where Canada is headed in its whole-of-government security investment in Sudan.

There is room, however, to support the capacity of national level security and justice institutions, building on past support in coordination with local priorities (in Juba as well as in Khartoum), as well as with other donor activity. For instance, research has pointed to gaps in strategic investment in infrastructure, training, and organizational development of the Southern Sudan Police Service.¹⁶ There is space for Canada to leverage its civilian policing role in UNMIS into support for the reform and modernization of the Sudan Police Service. Attention to policing, in complement to existing donor engagement in the security sector, and with attention to Juba’s security priorities, could support significant gains in security at the local levels. A strong, democratic and accountable police service could also help to support the smooth functioning of the elections and the referendum. Canada’s strong tradition of democratic policing means that it is well placed to engage in this work, in collaboration with local officials and other donors such as the UK, Switzerland, and/or Norway as part of holistic SSR process.

A second scenario worth exploring is to consider an increase in Canadian troop and police presence in UNMIS given the additional pressures facing peacekeepers in the South with the upcoming elections of 2010 and the referenda in Abyei and the South in 2011. The realism of that approach will in part be conditioned by the fate of the mission in Afghanistan beyond 2011, and by the UN demand for or interest in Canadian peacekeepers.

Aid Delivery. Canada is now an integral part of the Joint Donor Team (JDT), the first global effort to put Paris Principles on aid harmonization into practice by bringing six donors (UK, Canada, Sweden, Norway, The Netherlands and Denmark) together in a single office. The JDT has been particularly effective in helping to strengthen GoSS capacity in budget planning, and in aid coordination. However, an evaluation of the JDT

commissioned by the Government of Norway also noted that the JDT has been less effective in direct programming in poverty reduction and appears to lack a strategic focus on the challenges of aid delivery in a “fragile states” environment. Most worrisome is that there appears to be no coordinated donor framework linking international aid investments to CPA implementation. Looking forward, what role does Canada envision for the JDT beyond 2011? Is CIDA prepared to take a lead in one or more development sectors? What is the status of Canada’s planned support to the Basic Services Fund or to the fund for technical assistance? Should Canada revive JDT interest in a Civil Society Fund?

Conclusions
Since the onset of the Darfur crisis in 2003, what is striking about Canada’s engagement in Sudan is its relatively reactive quality. As opposed to identifying real comparative advantage where we can add technical depth, innovation, and financial staying power, the apparent logic of Canada’s intervention has been to fill gaps dictated by the US relationship or G8 considerations (for example in Canadian lift support to AMIS) and respond to media/public opinion to address the more visceral and disturbing aspects of the Darfur crisis (humanitarian assistance). While affirming the very practical impact of these Canadian contributions, military hardware, civilian policing, and prairie wheat are at best a short-term stopgap and not a durable development solution in the absence of a credible and sustained effort to achieve a political settlement in Darfur and assure the peaceful implementation of the CPA. Although a member of the Contact Group, the absence of a Special Envoy, as used by P3 countries, or sustained peace diplomacy by a small but effective country like Norway, and with the important exception of the ICC indictment, Canada has not latterly shown any particular entrepreneurial flair in taking on one or more of the many protracted conflict situations in Sudan (the Three Areas, Darfur peace processes, democratization, and key CPA implementation milestones, such as the census, elections and the referendum). In moving forward, then, it is important for Canada to consider strategically and over the medium to long term how its investments in Sudan might best support sustained and sustainable peace and development, in line with national priorities and in collaboration with other actors in the international community.